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INTRODUCTION 
 Planes to Tehran are no longer only filled with Iranian 
expatriates, adventurous tourists, or curious journalists. As Jack 
Straw, former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom keenly 
observed, the planes are now becoming filled with businessmen 
looking for investment opportunities.1 The revival of interest in doing 
business with Iran came after a historic deal was reached between 
Iran and five permanent members of the Security Council plus 
Germany.2 In a nutshell, the deal offered a joint plan of action in 
which Iran pledged to reduce its nuclear enrichment activity in return 
for an ease of economic sanctions. As a first step, Iran suspended its 
advanced uranium-fuel enrichment and Western countries released 
some of its blocked assets.3 The business community welcomed the 
deal, since Iran is a country with vast natural resources and economic 
opportunities. By some accounts, Iran has the largest reserve of gas 
and oil combined.4  
The positive reaction of the business community raised a red flag 
for the United States. Following a visit to Iran by a trade delegation 
from France representing 100 French companies, Secretary John 
Kerry had to call his French counterpart to explain that the sanction 
regime is still in place.5 This was followed by a strong warning by 
President Obama, reminding that the United States will go after 
violators of Iran sanctions.6 Despite this, the Iranian President, Hassan 

1. Jack Straw, Jack Straw: In Hassan Rouhani’s Iran, You Can Feel the Winds of 
Change, INDEPENDENT  (Jan. 17, 2014),  http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/jack-
straw-in-hasan-rouhanis-iran-you-can-feel-the-winds-of-change-9068260.html. 
2. Anne Gearin & Joby Warrick, Iran, World Powers Reach Historic Nuclear Deal, 
WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/
53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html. 
3. Rick Gladstone & Thomas Erdbrink, Temporary Nuclear Deal with Iran Take Effect, 
THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/world/middleeast/
iran.html. 
4. See BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, BP (June 2013), available at 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_
energy_2013.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).  
5. Kim Willsher & Saeed Kamali Dehghan, US Warns France Against Business with 
Iran After Trade Trip to Tehran, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/feb/05/us-warns-france-business-iran-trade-tehran  
6. Jeff Mason & Steve Holland, Obama says U.S. will deal harshly with violators of Iran 
sanctions, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-usa-iran-
idUSBREA1A2B920140211. 
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Rouhani, shows determination to break the economic sanctions 
regime.7  
 Iran has faced an unprecedented web of economic sanctions in 
the history of international relations, a complex regime consisting of 
UN, US, and EU sanctions. Less widely known, Iran has concluded a 
multitude of investment treaties aiming to promote and protect 
foreign investment. Amidst the enthusiasm for investing in Iran,8 
companies remained baffled as to the legal analyses and 
consequences of their potential investment in Iran. In fact, Iran’s 
investment case has posed unprecedented problems arising from the 
interplay between at least three legal regimes: Iran’s domestic 
investment regulations, economic sanction regime, and international 
investment regime. The problem of investment in Iran is a paramount 
example of a fragmented feature of today’s international law with 
conflicting regimes at play.9  This Article is a first attempt to place the 
clash between sanctions and investment regimes under scrutiny 
employing Iran as a case study. In doing so, this Article portrays a 
holistic and analytic picture of investment in Iran, its history, 
trajectory, and current status.  
Following the recent deal, Iran’s bilateral investment treaties and 
foreign investment contracts have become ever the more important. 
The recent escalation between Iran and the West under the 
Ahmadinejad government that resulted in the aggravation of 
economic sanctions was preceded by a period of reconciliation and 
engagement in which mutual effort was set forth to construct a steady 
economic relationship. The reconciliation efforts prompted a series of 
bilateral as well as multilateral treaties and contracts. The legal and 
policy consequences of these treaties and contracts, however, have 
been often neglected in the subsequent time of sanctions and hostility. 
Many companies ceased their operations in Iran, especially 
subsequent to 2010 when economic sanctions started to show their 
teeth. Despite the possibility of pursuing international law claims for 

7. Iran must break chains of sanctions: Rouhani, TEHRAN TIMES (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://www.tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/94-headline/114345-iran-must-break-
chain-of-sanctions-rouhani. 
8. Matt Clinch, Iran: The next investment frontier?, MSN MONEY (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://money.msn.com/investing/iran-the-next-investment-frontier. 
9. See generally International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
A/CN.4./L.682 (Martti Koskenniemi ed.) (Apr. 13, 2006) (discussing the issue of 
fragmentation in international law). 
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compensation of losses caused by sanctions, Iran remained idle in 
suing these companies for reasons that are unclear. One explanation 
could be the lack of legal strategy from the Iranian side or fear of 
counter legal measures from investors or states. In general, neither 
side has paid enough attention to the treaties and contracts 
incorporating arbitration clauses. Arbitration clauses in bilateral 
investment treaties and investment contracts may be invoked at any 
time for compensation and expropriation, which will result in almost 
unprecedented international litigation. This will trigger new legal 
challenges, which this Article aims to analyze.  
 Iran has always been one of the most important countries in 
the Middle East in terms of foreign direct investment. A country with 
a vast area of land and extremely rich natural resources undoubtedly 
stands as a major target for foreign investment. As the history of 
foreign investment shows, Iran has undergone ebbs and flows due to 
its political and social situation. Some of the social and political 
unrest, which has prompted major changes, has also been directly or 
indirectly related to the issue of foreign investment. For instance, the 
successful attempt to nationalize oil by Prime Minister Mosaddegh 
was a reaction to several British oil concession contracts, which were 
deemed unfair in the public mind of Iranians.10 Additionally, after the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, one of the main challenges was related to 
the expropriation of foreign investment, which was eventually 
addressed in the Algiers Accords. As a result, Iran became involved 
in an unprecedented institutionalized legal dispute settlement 
mechanism, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.  
Following an eight-year war with Iraq, Iran decided to attract 
foreign investment in order to rebuild and reconstruct its economy 
and infrastructure. This dire need coincided with a surge of political 
strength from reformists that culminated in the election of a reformist 
president in 1997. In a period of expansion in foreign investment from 
1995 to 2007, Iran drafted approximately 50 bilateral investment 
treaties (“BIT”) with both developed and developing countries. 
Through this, Iran signaled its determination to attract foreign 
investment from developed countries. In addition, Iran hoped to 
prevent and undermine the effects of international sanctions with the 
help of its bilateral treaties with various countries.  

10. MOSTAFA ELM, OIL, POWER, AND PRINCIPLE: IRAN’S OIL NATIONALIZATION AND 
ITS AFTERMATH 81-182 (1992). The Oil Nationalization Act was passed by the Iranian 
Parliament in 1951. Id.  
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In particular, there are three legal issues, which pose almost 
unprecedented challenges in international law and international 
arbitration. Firstly, the Iranian Constitution and some of its internal 
laws impose some restrictions as to the authority of the executive 
branch to conclude international treaties.11 This may complicate the 
enforcement of BITs in the case of disputes. Secondly, investors may 
invoke both international and national sanctions as an excuse for the 
breach of investment contracts. Thirdly, the issue is whether arbitral 
tribunals hold any reviewability power when dealing with 
international sanctions. This Article parses different aspects of 
international sanctions in the context of investment disputes and 
analyzes different scenarios in which international sanctions enter into 
the scene of international arbitration.  
This Article is divided into three main sections. In the first 
section, a brief background of investment disputes and laws in Iran is 
presented. In the subsequent section, Iran’s bilateral investment 
treaties are analyzed. Lastly, the effect of international sanctions in 
investment disputes is discussed. With the new dynamics resulting 
from the rapprochement of Iran and Western Countries on the one 
hand, and crippling sanctions on the other hand, the regime governing 
investment in Iran is more important—yet more challenging—than 
ever.  
I. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN IRAN  
 A. A Brief History 
 1. The Case of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
Iran, called Persia at the time, was subject to one of the earliest 
and most important investments in the modern era. In 1901, an 
agreement was reached between Royal Persia and a British investor 
named William Knox D’Arcy. This was a concession of several 
special rights concerning oil including exploration, exploitation, 
transport, and sales of gas and oil products. The concession was for 
60 years with the obligation that the Persian government would 

11. Farshad Ghodoosi, Comprehensive Solution to an Agreement: How the New Iran 
Deal is Framed under Iranian Law?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 22, 2014), available at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/22/guest-post-ghodoosi-comprehensive-solution-agreement-
new-iran-deal-framed-iranian-law/. This was an issue in the recent deal concluded between 
Iran and five plus one countries. Id. 
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receive 16% of the profit as royalty. After a few years, D’Arcy 
discovered oil in Persia and thus opened a new page in Iranian as well 
as world history.  In 1909, D’Arcy expanded his activities and a new 
company emerged out of this concession agreement. In 1909, D’Arcy 
and his co-workers incorporated the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 
which later became British Petroleum. This company was the first oil 
company operating in the Middle East.  
 In 1907, Persia had been divided by two powerful countries at 
the time. In an Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, the British took 
control of the southern part of Iran while the Russians agreed to hold 
influence in the northern part. The agreement stipulated a neutral zone 
between the British and Russian spheres of influence.12 Four years 
later, the British Government signed two agreements with Persia for 
investment and administration because “the progress and property of 
Persia should be promoted to the utmost.”13 These two agreements 
instigated anger and criticism.  For the administration, the British 
Government supplied advisors with “adequate powers . . . at the cost 
of Persian Government to be involved in contracts.”14 Regarding the 
financial side of the property of Persia, the British Government 
“offer[ed] to provide or arrange a substantial loan for the Persian 
Government, for which adequate security shall be sought.” The 
second agreement pertains to the loan of £2 million Pounds Sterling 
by the British Government at the interest rate of 7%. Security of the 
loans was mainly derived from the “revenues of the customs or other 
sources of income at the disposal of the Persian Government.” Other 
parts of the agreement deal with railway construction and other forms 
of transportation.15 Although Iran was never legally a protectorate of 
any country, some believe that the agreements of 1919 made Persia 
“de facto under the virtual control of Great Britain for an indefinite 
time to come.”16 
 The most important agreement regarding oil, however, dates 
back to 1933 between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian 
Government. The reason for the importance of this agreement is that 
the dispute resulting from this agreement landed in the docket of the 

12. Amos S. Hershey, The New Anglo-Persian Agreement, 13 AM. J. INT’L L. 749, 753 
(1919).  
13. Id. at 749.  
14. Id. at 749-50. 
15. Id. at 750. 
16. Id. at 753. 
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International Court of Justice. Under this concession agreement, or 
convention, the Anglo-Iranian Company was granted the exclusive 
right to “search for and extract petroleum as well as to refine or treat 
in any other manner and render suitable for commerce the petroleum 
obtained by it.”17 The concession also included the transportation of 
petroleum, its refinery and other measures to “render it suitable for 
commerce” for sale whether inside or outside of Persia.18 Iran’s 
government, in return, would receive four shillings per ton of 
petroleum sold as an annual royalty in addition to 20% of either 
dividends or reserves.19 The concession was, again, for sixty years 
ending on December 31, 1993. This agreement could not be annulled 
by the Iranian government, but incorporated an arbitration clause to 
which it conferred the right of annulment under certain circumstances.  
Article 22 stipulated an ad hoc arbitration body consisting of 
three arbitrators, two of whom were to be selected by each party and 
the third one by agreement of the two arbitrators. If the arbitrators 
failed to reach a consensus apropos the third umpire, the President of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice would appoint the third 
arbitrator. Article 22 sets the scope of arbitration as well: 
“Any differences between the parties of any nature whatever and 
in particular any differences arising out of the interpretation of 
this Agreement and of rights and obligations therein contained as 
well as any differences of opinion which may rise relative to 
questions for the settlement of which, by the terms of this 
Agreement, the agreement of both parties is necessary, shall be 
settled by arbitration.”20  
The scope of the arbitration is wide and vague. Also, it requires 
the ex post facto consent of parties to the arbitration. Article 26 
stipulated that if the oil company failed to pay “any sum awarded” to 
the Persian Government by the arbitration tribunal within a month 
after the award, then it would declare the Concession annulled.21  
This Concession, however, was not rendered annulled by an ad 
hoc arbitration tribunal due to default or a similar incident. The 

17. Revised Agreement: Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in THE MIDDLE 
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD: VOLUME 2: 
BRITISH SUPREMACY 1914-45 (J.C. Hurewitz ed., 1979).  
18. W.W. Bishop Jr., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 749, 750 
(1951).  
19. Id.  
20. Id. at 751. 
21. Id.  
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Iranian Government unilaterally revoked the Agreement. In 1951, the 
Iranian Parliament passed legislation on the nationalization of the oil 
industry in Iran. The legislation demands that the “entire revenue 
derived from oil and its products is indisputably due to the Persian 
nation.”22 Iran rejected the request for arbitration on the grounds that 
“the enforcement of the right of sovereignty of the Persian people, is 
not subject to arbitration, and no international authority in qualified to 
investigate this matter.”23 This denial led to a legal suit brought by the 
United Kingdom to the International Court of Justice. In the famous 
Anglo-Iranian oil case, the International Court of Justice accepted the 
preliminary objection of the Iranian government based on 
jurisdictional ground. The Court found no relevant treaty or 
convention between the United Kingdom and Iran and consequently 
“the court cannot derive jurisdiction in the present case from the 
terms of the Declaration ratified by Iran on September 19, 1932.” The 
United Kingdom tried to establish jurisdiction based on the Iranian 
Declaration of Acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. In 
this Declaration, Iran acceded to the International Court of Justice 
jurisdiction “in regard to situations of facts relating directly or 
indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions accepted by 
Persia and the subsequent to the ratification of this Declaration.”24  
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case posed a host of new 
challenges for international law. The Court correctly declined to 
recognize the concession agreement concluded between a private 
company and Iran as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Yet, 
interestingly enough, the Court did not enter into the international 
legal status of expropriation and property rights of the investor. This 
stirred a strong reaction from those who hoped the Court would 
recognize the in rem right of the investor in the case.25 Reactions were 

22. Id.  
23. Id. at 752. 
24. Charles G. Fenwick, The Order of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company Case, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 723, 725-26 (1951).  Some believe that the 
conflict here is about grammatical versus logical interpretation: “grammatically, taken, 
‘subsequent’ appears to relate to ‘treaties or conventions,’ which, if it were the correct 
interpretation, would nullify the argument of Great Britain based upon the earlier agreement of 
1928. The logical interpretation, however, is that the word ‘subsequent’ relates to ‘situations or 
facts.’ This is assumed by Great Britain to be the correct interpretation and it is consistent with 
the declaration made by a number of other states under Article 36 of the Statute.” See id.  
25. D.P. O’Connell, A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation, 4 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 267, 
268-69 (1955) (arguing “a concession may be regarded as analogous to an interested in land, 
2014] COMBATTING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1739 
centered on the idea that the individual right to property should be 
respected vis-à-vis the sovereign right to natural resources.  
Subsequent to the case, Iran negotiated with a consortium of 
eight international oil companies, including Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company. The negations resulted in a new concession agreement on 
September 19, 1954, in which Iran agreed to pay net sum of £25 
million Pounds Sterling to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in ten 
installments.26 Some scholars regard the new concession agreement as 
evidence that Iran admitted the property right and other privileges of 
the investors.27  
B. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
One of the significant consequences of the resolution of the Iran 
Hostage Crisis was the establishment of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. 
This arbitral body has become a predecessor to the subsequent 
investment arbitration tribunals, including the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). Its awards and 
approaches to issues such as expropriation, nationality, and contracts 
have been treated as authorities in later cases in NAFTA, ICSID, and 
other tribunals. For instance, Gibson and Drahzol28 found that 17 
ICSID arbitration awards have cited the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
awards amounting to 44.7% of all the awards on merits. In the case of 
NAFTA, out of sixteen examples of awards, fourteen of them (87.5%) 
cited precedents from the Iran-US Claims Tribunal whether on issues 
related to merits or jurisdiction. Additionally, as some scholars 
believe, the Tribunal set the stage for succeeding UN bodies such as 
the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) or the 
Claims Resolution Tribunal for Swiss Dormant Accounts.29 These 

giving rise to rights in rem which cannot be unilaterally abrogated without importing an 
obligation to pay compensation”). 
26. Kenneth S. Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 AM. J. INT’L L. 
260, 273-74 (1958); Abolbashar Farmanfarma, The Oil Agreement Between Iran and the 
International Oil Consortium: the Law Controlling, 34 TEX. L. REV. 259, 261 (1955).  
27. Id. at 274. 
28. Christopher S. Gibson & Christopher R. Drahozal, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration, in THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25, THE 
CASES EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE & INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
22-27 (2007).  
29. David D. Caron & John R. Crook, Concluding Reflections, in THE IRAN-UNITED 
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION 369 
(2000). 
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clearly demonstrate the importance of one Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
and its continuing impact on arbitration and investment law.  
The Tribunal was established pursuant to the Algiers Accords. 
The agreement was predicated on the release of the hostages who 
were held in Iran for 444 days. The United States, in return, agreed to 
return Iranian assets and withdraw from the prosecution of Iran in 
international courts on this matter. Following the agreement, the 
hostages were released and US$8.1 billion was transferred to an 
escrow account. Out of US$2 billion of unfrozen Iranian assets, US$1 
billion were also kept in a security account from which sums awarded 
to US nationals by the Tribunal could be collected.30 The main 
document establishing the Tribunal is the Claim Settlement 
Declaration. Article II sets the scope of the Tribunal: 
“1. An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding 
claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of 
nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim 
which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that 
constitutes the subject matter of that national’s claim, if such claims 
and counterclaims are outstanding on the date of this Agreement, 
whether or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, contracts 
(including transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or 
bank guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property 
rights… 
  2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims 
of the United States and Iran against each other arising out of 
contractual arrangements between them for the purchase and sale of 
goods and services… 
  3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as specified in 
Paragraphs 16-17 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of 
January 19, 1981, over any dispute as to the interpretation or 
performance of any provision of that Declaration.”31 
 The scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is rather broad. It 
includes sales of goods and services, agency relationships, export and 
import, expropriation and state responsibility, corporation-related 

30. CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL 7-10 (1998).  
31. Iran-United States Claims Settlement Declaration, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declar
ation.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
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matters and many more. In some areas, such as joint venture, the 
Tribunal is the only international body that has systematically 
analyzed the legal treatment of joint ventures.32 This broad 
jurisdiction was accompanied by the application of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules. 
Pursuant to Article III paragraph 2 “members of the tribunal shall be 
appointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its business in accordance 
with the arbitration rules of the UNCITRAL.”33 UNCITRAL rules 
were adopted in 1976, and the enforcement of the rules in the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal was the first systematic use of them.34 This is another 
important legacy of this Tribunal. 
 The Iran-US Claims Tribunal had an enormous impact on the 
issue of investor-state arbitration. For instance, on the issue of 
nationality and dual citizenship, it introduced the concept of dominant 
nationality. In case number A18, the Tribunal held that “it has 
jurisdiction over claims against Iran by dual Iran-United States 
nationals when the dominant and effective nationality of the claimant 
during the relevant period from the date the claim arose until 19 
January 1981 was that of the United States.”35 As a result, it is the 
country in which the national is actively engaged that determines the 
effective nationality.  
Another issue was expropriation. Arbitrators appointed by the 
Iranian government were inclined to narrowly construe the term 
expropriation to exclude shareholders and contractual rights. They 
referred to the Treaty of Amity between Iran and United States 
(1950). The Tribunal, however, concluded that expropriation should 
be interpreted based on customary international law and not the 
Treaty. Consequently, in the case of Amoco International Finance, 
the Tribunal treated an investor, in the interest of the joint stock 
company, as a property right, which became subject of Iran 
expropriation. In the Mobile Oil Iran Case, the Tribunal also treated 
take-away of contractual rights as expropriation.36 These are some 

32. Daniel Barstow Magraw, The Tribunal in Jurisprudential Perspective, in THE IRAN-
UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY 23 
(Richard B. Lillich et al. eds., 1998). 
33. Iran-United States Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 31.  
34. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 30 at 16-17.  
35. Id. at 32. 
36. Mark R. Joelson, The Contribution of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to the 
International Law on Expropriation, in THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25, THE CASES 
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instances of the importance of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in 
international investment law and arbitration.  
C. Recent Investment Disputes  
  It seems that there are no investment arbitration cases 
involving the recent wave of conclusions of BITs by Iran. There have 
been a few cases related to investment before the Revolution 
involving arbitration. For instance, in National Iranian Oil Company 
v. Ashland Oil Inc.,37 the respondent allegedly refused to pay the 
crude oil it received due to possible turmoil following the Iranian 
Revolution. Subsequently, the respondent did not participate in an 
arbitration proceeding in Iran (the place of arbitration according to the 
contract) due to the potential dangers for Americans. The National 
Iranian Oil Company then sought to compel arbitration in Mississippi 
arguing that commercial impracticability necessitated change of the 
arbitration forum. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit declared that the 
agreement to arbitrate is not severable from the contract and the court 
cannot compel arbitration in another forum besides that which the 
parties explicitly agreed.  
 In another case, Iran tried to compel arbitration in Delaware in 
National Iranian Oil Co v. Mapco Int’l, Inc.38 In 1979, the National 
Iranian Oil Company entered into a contract with Mapco International 
for the sale of crude oil. According to the arbitration clause, laws of 
Iran should govern the award and the seat of arbitration should be in 
Tehran in case of disputes. The District Court as well as the Third 
Circuit dismissed the case because the petition was time-barred by the 
Delaware statute of limitation. Iran brought the claim six years after 
the respondent’s refusal to arbitrate, which exceeded the Delaware 
state of limitation of three years.  
 Iran has filed other cases to compel arbitration in disputes in 
the US and elsewhere. As the Ashland and Mapco cases show, Iran 
did not follow a very thoughtful strategy for its investment disputes. 
For instance, Iran could have proceeded with arbitration in Tehran 
and later tried to enforce the award in US courts. In investment 
arbitration with Israel, Iran resorted to French Courts, which follow a 

EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE & INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra 
note 28, at 221. 
37. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987). 
38. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, 983 F. 2d 485 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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broader denial of access to justice doctrine. Iran entered into an 
agreement concerning construction and maintenance of an oil pipeline 
with Israel in 1968. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. 
Upon the refusal of Israel to appoint an arbitrator, Iran brought its 
case to French Courts on the ground of denial of access to justice 
pursuant to Article 1493 French new civil procedure code.39 In 
National Iranian Oil Co. v. Israel the Court of Appeals of Paris 
agreed with the Iran National Oil Company that the claim was 
admissible in French Courts due to the denial of justice even when 
there was no reference to French law in the contract. It also declared 
that if either party failed to appoint an arbitrator by a certain date it 
would select one on behalf of the defaulting party.40  
 Iran is currently engaged in a controversial dispute over a gas 
contract it concluded with United Arab Emirates (the “UAE”) 
involving allegations of bribery and corruption. Due to the investment 
of Iranian nationals in the UAE, Iran and the UAE have not 
concluded a bilateral investment treaty. The famous 25-year Crescent 
contract has been concluded with the UAE for the exportation of gas 
after five years of negotiation finishing in 2001. According to the 
contract, Iran is obligated to export 500 million cubic meters of gas to 
the UAE. The low contract price along with its long-term 
commitment persuaded the Iranian parliament to enter the scene and 
call the contract against Iran’s national interest. Further investigation 
of Iran’s parliament showed signs of bribery and corruption. In the 
meantime, Crescent petitioned the International Court of Arbitration 
claiming breach of contract by Iran.41 This case is one of the highly 
politicized investment disputes involving Iran in recent years and as a 
result, public information is sparse. Based on the available 
information, if the deal was reached through fraud and bribery, Iran 

39. Lindsay L. Chichester, National Iranian Oil Co. v. Israel: France Reinterprets Its 
Code to Prevent “Denial of Justice,” Leaving Israel Between Iran and a Hard Place, 11 TUL. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 383, 384-85 (2003). Article 1493 of France’s nouveau code de procedure 
provides: “The arbitration agreement may, directly or by reference to arbitration rules, appoint 
the arbitrator or arbitrators or provide a mechanism for their appointment. If a difficulty arises 
in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal in an arbitration which takes place in France or which 
the parties have agreed shall be governed by French Procedural law, the most diligent party 
may, in the absence of a clause to the contrary, apply to the president of the Tribunal de 
Grande Instance of Paris in accordance with procedures of Article 1457.” Id.  
40. Id. at 384-85.   
41. Tamsin Carlisle, Iran Cancels Gas Deals with Crescent Petroleum, THE NATIONAL 
(Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/iran-cancels-gas-deal-with-crescent
-petroleum (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).   
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might be able to cancel the contract. In all other cases, Iran cannot 
invoke its internal law prohibition on the public sector arbitration 
clause to justify its breach.42 
 Recently and after a long legal battle, Iran successfully 
challenged some of the US Courts decisions rendered against Iran, as 
violation of the Algiers Accords in Iran-US Claims Tribunal.43 The 
Tribunal awarded Iran for expenses it reasonably incurred in the 
litigations in the United States.  
D. Investment Laws 
 1. Background 
After the revolution occurred in 1979, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran succeeded Pahlavi’s kingdom as the government of Iran. Soon 
thereafter, Iran was engaged in the longest war of the 20th century 
with Iraq. This brought about a lot of devastation and claimed 
numerous lives in both Iran and Iraq. After the war, Iran was in urgent 
need of investment to rebuild, recover and construct new facilities and 
expand its infrastructure. The first comprehensive Iranian law 
pertaining to foreign investment dates back to 1955 before the 
Revolution. In the Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign 
Investment, foreign individuals had to obtain Iranian Government 
approval in order to benefit from its privileges.  In this 7-article 
legislation, there is no reference to any alternative dispute resolution 
including arbitration.44  
 In 2002, Iran passed its second foreign direct investment-
related law after almost 50 years. The Foreign Investment Promotion 
and Protection Act (FIPPA)45 was a more comprehensive act 

42. In a long battle with a Turkish cellular company, Turkcell, Iran won its first investor-
state arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty. Iran Wins Landmark Investor-State Case, 
GAR, available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33081/iran-wins-landmark-
investor-state-case/ (last visted Mar. 3, 2014).  
43. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Award No. 602-A15(IV)/A24-FT, Iran –
US Claims Tribunal, paras. 1-4, available at http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/
AWARD/1-A-AWARD%20NO.%20602-A15%20(IV)A24-FT-EN.pdf. 
44. See The Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment, PARIS 
TIMES, http://www.parstimes.com/law/foreign_investment55.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
45. See Ardeshir Atashi, Comparative Analysis of the Iranian Foreign Investment Law 
and the World Bank Guidelines on Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 12 Y.B.  ISLAMIC 
& MIDDLE E. L. 111, 115-16 (2005-2006); see also The Foreign Investment Promotion and 
Protection Act of 2005 (Iran), available at http://gsi.ir/General/Lang_en/Page_26/
Start_0/TypeId_All/LawsId_24/Action_MoreInfo/Foreign.Investment.Promotion.and.Protectio
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compared to the earlier one. Upon admission of the investment, the 
investor enjoys some privileges and rights based on this Act. Iranians 
who invest “capital with foreign origin” are also deemed to be 
“foreign investor[s]” under Article 1.46 Investment includes, inter 
alia, cash funds, machinery and equipment, tools and spares, patent 
rights, technical know-how, trademarks, transferable dividends of 
foreign investors and other permissible items approved by the Council 
of Ministers under Article 1.47 Article 2, however, limits the scope of 
investment. It should “bring about economic growth, upgrade 
technology, enhance the quality of products, and increase 
employment opportunities and exports” (Article 2).48 It also should 
not pose any threat to the national security and public interests. These 
qualifications, which remind us of the Salini Doctrine on 
Investment,49 discourage investors who do not necessarily hold the 
intention of promoting economic growth in Iran.  
 FIPPA stipulates several benefits and privileges for foreign 
investors. For instance, Article 8 sets the principle of national and 
non-discrimination treatment towards foreign investors.50 In the case 
of expropriation, pursuant to Article 9 the Iranian Government 
commits itself to providing compensation. Compensation is “on the 
basis of the real value of the investment immediately before 
expropriation.” Furthermore, the Act provides some privileges 
regarding foreign currency exchange for foreign investors. For 
instance, foreign investors can collect their investment and interest in 
foreign currency.51 Regarding arbitration, FIPPA is not very 
progressive. Although it recognizes the referral to arbitration by 
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n.Act.(.Fippa).html. This act was considered to be inconsistent with Islamic law by Guardian 
Council. Eventually, it was ratified by Expediency Council, which has the authority to confirm 
legislations that have been passed by the parliament but were rejected by Guardian Council. Id.   
46. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2005, art. 1 (Iran). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. art. 2(b). 
49. Salini Costruttori S.P.A and Italstrade v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (Jul. 31, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004) ("one may 
add the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the investment as an 
additional condition”). In the Salini ICSID case, the Tribunal declared that investment should 
contribute to the economy of the host state, otherwise it cannot be considered an investment. 
See id.  
50. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2005, art. 8 (Iran). 
51. Id. arts. 13, 14, 17(a). However, we should note that this privilege is subject to the 
approval of the investment board and confirmation of the minister of economic affairs and 
finance. Id.  
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bilateral investment treaties, there is no explicit consent to any 
specific arbitration body. Article 19 mentions:  
 “Disputes arising between the Government and the Foreign 
Investors with regard to their respective mutual obligations 
within the context of investments under FIPPA, if not settled 
through negotiations, shall be referred to domestic courts, unless 
the Law ratifying the Bilateral Investment Agreement with the 
respective government of the Foreign Investor provides for 
another method for settlement of disputes.”52 
 This might be considered an achievement since it allows the 
referral to arbitration in the case of dispute between foreign investors 
and the Iranian Government. As we will see in the next section, one 
of the main obstacles of foreign investment is the Article on 
arbitration in the Constitution. 
 E. Unfavorable National Laws to Foreign Investment  
 The Iranian legal system has serious shortcomings regarding 
support of foreign direct investment. Some of them relate to the 
Constitution and some others to statutes. Article 81 of the 
Constitution, which concerns foreign business stipulates: “Granting of 
concessions to foreigners for the incorporation of companies or 
institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, service, or 
mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden.”53 
 The broad language of the Article is quite discouraging for 
foreign companies hoping to invest in Iran. Foreign companies have 
to establish subsidiaries in Iran because they cannot be the majority 
shareholders. The Council of Guardians, which is the interpretive 
authority of the Iranian Constitution,54 specifies that in private sectors 
foreign companies can own up to 49% of companies’ shares. 
Furthermore, companies that are involved in commerce with the 
Iranian Government can be incorporated in Iran for the purpose of 
their legal and operational activities.55 It is also worth mentioning that 

52. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act, BRITISH IRANIAN CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE, available at http://www.bicc.org.uk/downloads/fippa.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 
2014); Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2002 (Iran). 
53. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 81.  
54. Id. art. 98. 
55. The interpretation of the Council of Guardians regarding Article 81 of the 
Constitution can be found at their official website: http://www.shora-gc.ir/Portal/Home/
ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&ID=75c294c8-9fe5-4d8f-89a1-f77f7b1333c7&LayoutID=
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Article 5 of Regulation on Investment in the Free Trade-Industrial 
Zones states: “Foreign investors may invest in the economic activities 
of the Zone up to any ratio (of the amount of investment).”56 
Therefore, in certain parts of Iran considered to be “free zones,” some 
restrictive regulations such as the aforementioned Article are not 
enforced. Legally, however, this approach might not be very strong 
since the Constitution rules over all parts of the country in a uniform 
manner. 
 Another major obstacle in the Constitution concerning foreign 
investment is Article 44. This article defines the scope of the state 
sector, which should be publicly owned. In practice, the expansive 
and wide scope of this Article places many important sectors of the 
economy in the hands of the Government. Article 44 paragraph II 
states:  
   “The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother 
industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, 
power generation, dams, and large-scale irrigation networks, 
radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, 
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be 
publicly owned and administered by the State.”57 
 Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution poses yet another 
critical challenge for the Iranian Government in the area of foreign 
investment. The Government has desired to transfer its less lucrative 
businesses to the private sector so that better management would 
revive the businesses. For this reason, starting in 2005 under the 
supervision of the Expediency Council, the Iranian Government 
started to gradually transfer its businesses, including banking and 
communications, to the private sector.58 The result was not as 

41ac3004-064d-4591-9605-3bb75173947b&CategoryID=e2beada8-28bd-4ff4-a9f8-84d4ee0
a2973.  
56. Regulations on Investment in the Free Trade-Industrial Zones (Iran),   available at 
http://www.iran-investment.org/irsubpage11.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
57. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 44.  
58. The Supreme Leader of Iran announced a new interpretation of Article 44 of the 
Constitution in order to initiate a strong momentum for privatization. EVALEILA PESARAN, 
IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: REFORM AND COUNTER-REFORM IN THE 
POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA 136 (2011).  
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favorable as free trade advocates hoped, yet the movement has started 
in that direction.59  
 Lastly, it is Article 139 of the Constitution which is related to 
arbitration. Foreign investors, in general, are skeptical and reluctant to 
refer their disputes to Iranian domestic courts and tend to prefer 
arbitration. Article 139 of the Iranian Constitution, however, is a 
major obstacle in this regard: 
“The settlement of claims relating to public and state property or 
the referral thereof to arbitration is in every case contingent on 
the approval of the Board of Ministers, and the Parliament must 
be informed of these matters.  In cases where one party to the 
dispute is a foreigner, as well as in important domestic cases, the 
approval of the Parliament must also be obtained.  Law will 
specify the cases which are considered to be important.”60 
Article 139 is drafted in a way that seems to favor the Iranian 
side of the dispute. In other words, pursuant to an arbitration clause in 
a bilateral investment treaty, the Iranian Government is subject to this 
Article only if it decides to refer the matter to arbitration.61 On the 
other hand, the foreign investors can refer the matter to arbitration and 
the Iranian side can appear in front of the arbitration body and defend 
its position. In this case, it seems there is no need for the approval of 
the Council of Ministry or the Assembly. Furthermore, the Iranian 
side cannot invoke the above-mentioned Constitutional requirement 
to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.62  

59. The reform did not result in the desired outcome due to several factors including lack 
of robust private sector, government interference, lack of necessary capital, and the intrusion 
of military sector. Id. at 161-89.  
60. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 139 
61. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Division on 
Transnational Corporations and Investment, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Division on Investment, Technology, and Enterprise Development,  
Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of  Investments between the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of _______________., in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT INSTRUMENT: A COMPENDIUM VOLUME VI 479, 479-484 (2002) [hereinafter 
IRANIAN MODEL BIT]. In some Iranian BITs, in the arbitration clause there is a phrase, which 
might be inserted due to this Constitution obstacle. Paragraph 2 of Article 12 of Iranian Model 
BIT declares: “either of them may refer the dispute to the competent courts of the host 
Contracting Party or with due regard to their own laws and regulations to an arbitral tribunal of 
three members referred to paragraph 5 below.” Id. (emphasis added). 
62. Ardeshir Atai, Arbitration of Investment Disputes under Iranian Investment Treaties, 
14  J. OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 130, 130 (2011). 
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There are other domestic provisions that are not friendly to 
foreign investment. For instance, labor law in Iran, generally 
speaking, makes it difficult for employers to lay-off employees.63  
Furthermore, originally the tax imposed on corporations was 54%, 
and it has been reduced to 25%.64 Still, this might be high taxation for 
corporations, which can choose to operate in countries with much 
lower income tax rates.  
There are other obstacles in Iranian domestic law which make 
foreign investment difficult. Ownership of real property for foreign 
nationals requires a special process.65 First, the local Registry Office 
should be adequately informed about the purchase. The transfer of 
ownership is then subject to approval by the office of Ministry of 
Foreign affairs on the condition of the principle of reciprocity.66 
The fact that Iran is not part of major international institutions on 
investment further complicates the foreign investment. Iran is not part 
of ICISD, MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), or the 
WTO (World Trade Organization). On the other hand, Iran has 
recently been active in the realm of arbitration. Iran has adopted the 
New York Convention67 and has passed legislation on arbitration 
pursuant to UNCITRAL Rules.68 However, internationally, the US 
and EU economic sanctions have made foreign direct investment 
incredibly difficult in Iran.  
F. The Effect of Iran’s Investment Laws on Arbitration   
Considering the aforementioned constitutional restraints, the 
enforcement of awards can be problematic. The Iranian domestic 
legal system has recognized arbitral awards both in Civil Procedure 

63. See, e.g., Art 21-33 of Iran Labor Law, available at http://www.princeton.edu/
irandataportal/laws/labor-law/laborcontracts/. 
64. IRAN: COMPANY LAWS AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK, VOLUME 1: STRATEGIC 
INFORMATION AND BASIC LAW 157-60 (2012).  
65. Iran Export, Investment Climates: Status of Foreign Nationals, http://www.iran-
export.ir/sections/investmentclimates/statusof.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
66. Id.   
67. The Iranian Parliament ratified the New York Convention for Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in April 10, 2001. The Law of Accession of Islamic 
Republic of Iran Government to the New York Convention for Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitration Award Drafted in 10 June, 1958, ISLAMIC PARLIAMENT RESEARCH CENTER,  
http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90503 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
68. Hamid Gharavi, The 1997 Iranian International Commercial Arbitration Law: The 
UNCITRAL Model Law à L'Iranienne, 15 ARB. INT’L  85, 85 (1999). 
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and International Commercial Arbitration Law.69 In 2001, Iran also 
became a member of the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.70 However, all of these 
regulations include an exception concerning public policy or similar 
concepts.71 In other words, the enforcement of arbitral awards is 
conditioned to the situation where the awards are not contrary to the 
public policy of the Government. In this situation, Article 139 of the 
Iranian Constitution looms over all the arbitral awards. Many of the 
arbitration awards that concern “settlement of claims relating to 
public and state property” belong to the public sector (Article 44) and 
require approval of the Assembly (Article 139).72 This provision of 
the Constitution complicates the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
On the other hand, once the Iranian Government signs a treaty or 
contract comprising an arbitration clause, it seems implausible to 
refuse its enforcement based on a public policy reservation related to 
constitutional provisions. In other words, once the government agrees 
to arbitration on certain issues, it clearly implies that referral to 
arbitration in that case is not against its public policy. Evidently, if the 
merits of the award violate “the most basic notions of morality and 
justice,”73 Iranian courts can plausibly refuse to recognize and enforce 
the award.74   

69. Id. at 86-9; Aini Dadrasii Madani [Civil Procedure Code] Tehran 1379 [2000] arts. 
454-501 (Iran); Qanuni Davari Tejari Beinolmelal [International Commercial Arbitration 
Code] Tehran 1376 [1997] (Iran).  
70. New York Convention Countries, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION,  
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014).  
71. Art. V (2)(b) of the New York Convention declares: “[t]he recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. (hereinafter the New York Convention)  Paragraph 2 of article 34 
International Commercial Arbitration Code of Iran also enumerates public policy as a ground 
for invalidation of arbitral awards: “if the content of the award is contrary to public policy or 
public morality or the mandatory rules of this Act.” Qanuni Davari Tejari Beinolmelal, supra 
note 64. 
72. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran] 1358 [1980], arts. 44, 139.  
73. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 
969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit declared that the public policy exception to 
enforcement of the awards should be construed narrowly and only in cases related to the 
state’s most basic notions of morality and justice. Id.  
74. William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law: 
Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 297 (2006-2007). 
Constitutional requirement of due process, minimum contact, and forum non conveniens have 
prompted tensions with enforcement of foreign awards in American Courts as well. This 
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Although the bar for public policy reservation at the enforcement 
stage is high, the constitutional restraints can be invoked at the 
jurisdictional stage as well. The Iranian Government may invoke the 
constitutional prohibition as an objection to the jurisdiction of the 
arbitration tribunal in the case of investment disputes. In this regard, 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 
that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.75 This rule is without 
prejudice to Article 46.” Article 46, on the other hand, declares that 
states can argue that their consent was flawed in cases in which 
“violation of internal law was manifest and concerned a rule of its 
internal law of fundamental importance.”76 Hence, it seems 
reasonable to argue that a constitutional prohibition amounts to a 
‘manifest violation’ of internal law of fundamental importance. In our 
context, therefore, the Iranian Government can refer to the 
constitutional prohibition to prove its flawed consent to arbitration 
unless the Assembly approves the arbitration. However, this 
conclusion does not seem plausible both in international commercial 
and investment arbitration.   
In the context of international commercial arbitration, it has been 
argued that it is the ‘international ordre public’ and ‘common law of 
arbitration’ which mandate that states cannot invoke their internal law 
to repudiate consent to arbitration. In the Bentler v. Belgium case, the 
Tribunal did not accept the jurisdictional objection raised by Belgium 
pursuant to Article 1672(2) of the Belgian Code judiciaire as to the 
capacity of the officials to agree to arbitration.  The Tribunal argued 
that international public order rejected the jurisdictional objection 
whenever a State with knowledge and intent, consents to arbitration 
and later tries to nullify it with invocation of its internal law.77 
Therefore, even if internal law is essential for national public order, 
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tension has been not been fully settled by precedents, which “all seem less than optimum in 
their articulation of guiding principles.” Id.  
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
76. Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 46 (“1. A State may not invoke the fact that 
its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal 
law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation 
was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 2. A 
violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the 
matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.”). 
77. Jan Paulsson, May a State Invoke its Internal Law to Repudiate Consent to 
International Commercial Arbitration?, 2 ARB. INT’L 90, 90 (1986). 
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the international public order dictates that states abide by their 
concluded arbitration clauses. Some scholars posit that this argument 
complements the modern rule of sovereignty immunity.78 Agreement 
to arbitration is an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity and if a 
State can invoke its internal law to repudiate arbitration, it defeats the 
purpose of the waiver.79  
Another argument might be that, at least, in cases where the 
internal law of one party governs all aspects of the contract, 
constitutional prohibition should prevent the arbitration from 
proceeding. A similar issue came up in a case involving Iran. In 
Cementation International Ltd v. Republique Islamique d’Iran,80 Iran 
raised an objection pursuant to its constitutional prohibition. Based on 
a contract between the Iran Ministry of Health and a British 
Company, all related disputes should be resolved through conciliation 
or arbitration. The contract also provided that Iranian law is governed 
by the disputes and the arbitral tribunal should sit in Geneva. After 
Iran defaulted on appointing an arbitrator, the Court of Arbitration of 
ICC assigned an arbitrator for the defaulting party. The Tribunal 
proceeded notwithstanding Iran’s objection on the ground that, inter 
alia, the tribunal had not been constituted lawfully pursuant to the 
contract and that the arbitration was against Iran’s constitution. Iran 
challenged the award and sought its nullification in front of Swiss 
courts. Both the lower and court of appeals concluded that parties 
agreed to ICC award.81 The Swiss courts ruled that parties could not 
invoke their constitutional provision in order to set aside the 
arbitration clause.82  Although it is not obvious why the court (and the 
tribunal) applied ICC rules, the argument concerning constitutional 
provision is powerful. Once a state, short of cases of corruption and 
fraud, acquiesced to refer a matter to arbitration, it implicitly waives 
its right to invoke all internal conflicting provisions.   

78. See, e.g., id. at 98. 
79. Id.  
80. See W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 60-
63 (1986). The Court followed the Tribunal decision in the ICC Case no. 3526 (1982) and 
declared that “to admit the principle of the approval of recourse to arbitration by the 
government or legislature of a country that is party to the arbitration agreement is to allow that 
party to unilaterally avoid the obligations that it freely undertook.” FOUCHARD GAILLARD 
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 324 n. 367 (Emmanuel Gaillard 
& John Savage eds., 1999).  
81. STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FURTHER SELECTED 
WRITINGS 231-32 (2011). 
82. Id.  
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In the context of international investment law, the same 
conclusion can be reached. Since the governing legal body of 
investment arbitration is international law, treaties have priority over 
domestic law and “a State would be in violation of international law if 
it gave effect to the conflicting rule of domestic law.”83 The 
conflicting rule of domestic law, however, might, arguably, affect the 
consent of the state. In Brandes v. Venezuela, the Venezuelan 
Government challenged its (unilateral) consent to arbitration based on 
its Constitution and the several decisions of the Venezuelan Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice.84 The ICSID tribunal concluded that the consent 
of Venezuela cannot be inferred from the Constitution and further the 
decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice are not binding on the 
ICSID Tribunal.85  
The issue of unequivocal consent should not, however, be 
conflated with the issue of conflicting domestic laws. Consent, as the 
ICISD tribunal emphasized in the case of Plama v. Bulgaria “should 
be clear and unambiguous.”86 On the other hand, when a state clearly 
expressed its consent to arbitration, it cannot later invoke its 
conflicting internal law, including its constitution, to refuse to accept 
the arbitration jurisdiction. In Iran’s case, it also seems that the 
constitutional prohibition is not of fundamental importance especially 
when the executive branch consents to arbitration. Lastly, it is 
important to note that, in cases of fraud and corruption, private parties 
cannot take advantage of contracts when the state officials are clearly 
acting beyond their authority.87 
II. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 A. Legal Effects of BITs  
 Bilateral Investment Treaties are gaining increasing 
importance in international law. BITs are, as some scholars believe, 

83. Paulsson, supra note 77, at 99 n. 1.  
84. Brandes Inv. Partners LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/3, Award, ¶ 48 (Aug. 2, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/BrandesAward.PDF. 
85. Id. at ¶ 96-98. 
86.  “It is a well-established principle, both in domestic and international law, that such 
an agreement [of the parties to submit a matter to arbitration] should be clear and 
unambiguous.” Plama Consortium Ltd. v. the Republic of Bulg., ICISD Case No. ARB/03/24, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 198 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID
/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC521_En&caseId=C24.  
87. Paulsson, supra note 77, at 98. 
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the product of fear of developed countries of nationalization and 
expropriation.88 Iran performed one of the earliest and significant 
nationalization processes in 1951.89 The UN General Assembly also 
recognized this nationalization of rights of developing states.90 This 
further complicated the scene for developed countries. This caused 
developed countries to search for and find alternative ways to protect 
their investment and obtain proper compensation such as in cases of 
expropriation. The first BIT dates back to 1959 between West 
Germany and Pakistan and since then approximately 2600 BITs have 
been concluded between different countries.91  
 As we saw, Iran has been the subject of foreign investment for 
almost hundred years. The past investment agreements have created 
cynicism towards foreign investment among Iranians. The 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly shows the overall 
skepticism regarding foreign investment. One of the main concerns 
dealt with providing concession to foreign companies for an extended 
period of time as happened in the case of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company.  
Surprisingly, however, Iran is a party to more than fifty BITs.92 
The United States, by way of comparison, has concluded around forty 

88. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreement, 12 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 167-169 (2005-2006).   
89. In a battle with Anglo-Iran Oil Company (AIOC), Mossadegh, Iran’s prime minister, 
announced that Iran would sell oil directly to customers. See MOSTAFA ELM, OIL, POWER, 
AND PRINCIPLE: IRAN’S OIL NATIONALIZATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 144 (1991). It was 
followed by the passage of Iran’s nationalization act in Parliament and the evacuation of Brits 
and employees of AIOC from oil-rich area of Abadan, Iran. See id. at 156-60.  
90. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 
3201 (S-VI), ¶ 4(e), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974) (“Full permanent sovereignty 
of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these 
resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation 
with means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of 
ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of 
the State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to 
prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right.”). 
91. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (2010).  
92. Bilateral Investment Treaties, ORGANIZATION FOR INVESTMENT ECONOMIC AND 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OF IRAN, http://www.oietai.ir/en/investmenguide/treaties  (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2014). According to the website of Organization for Investment Economic and 
Technical Assistance of Iran affiliated with Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance the list 
of the countries Iran has BITs with is as follows: Armenia (1995), Belarus (1995), Tajikistan 
(195) Georgia (1995), Pakistan (1995), Kazakhstan (1996), Turkmenistan (1996), Yemen 
(1996), Ukraine (1996), Kyrgyzstan (1996), Bosnia & Herzegovina (1996), Azerbaijan (1996), 
Turkey (1996), South Africa (1997), Lebanon (1997), Syria (1998), Switzerland (1998), 
Poland (1998), Poland (1998), South Korea (1998), Bulgaria (1998), Italy (1999), Zimbabwe 
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BITs.93 This shows, despite cynicism towards foreign investment, 
sanctions and domestic problems, Iran has been quite active in the 
area of BITs. These BITs are with both developed and developing 
countries. They were signed primarily between 1995 and 2007, 
almost 5 years after the end of the Iran-Iraq war and extend until the 
aftermath of new sanctions.  
 However the question is what is the legal status of the 
investment treaties under Iranian Law? Do they bind the Iranian 
government? According to Article 77 of Iran’s Constitution 
“International treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be 
approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.”94 The broad 
language of this article includes almost every important international 
legal activity of the Iranian Government. If the Assembly passes a 
specific treaty, then pursuant to Civil Code Article 9: “Treaty 
stipulations which have been, in accordance with the Constitutional 
Law, concluded between the Iranian Government and other 
government, shall have the force of law.”95 Therefore, for BITs, it 
seems that the approval of the Assembly is required. After the 
ratification of the Assembly (Parliament), they are treated as 
municipal laws of Iran. According to the official website, almost all 
the 58 BITs have been ratified by the Iranian Parliament and roughly 
50 of BITs are in force as of today.96   
 However, when it comes to arbitration and its jurisdiction, 
national municipal law is of secondary importance. In other words, 
when there is an explicit consent to arbitration, the resort to local 
authorities and municipal laws might not be accepted. For instance, 
two cases were brought to ICSID for the interpretation of a national 
law in Venezuela. Article 22 of the Law on the Promotion and 

(1998), Qatar (1998), Sudan (1998), Croatia (2000), Uzbekistan (2000), Macedonia (2000), 
China (2000), Srilanka (2000), Morocco (2001), Austria (2001), Tunisia (2001), Bangladesh 
(2001), Oman (2001), Romania (2002), Hellenic Republic (2002), Malaysia (2002), Germany 
(2002), North Korea (2002), Bahrain (2002), Spain (2002), Finland (2002), France (2003), 
Algeria (2003), Ethiopia (2003), Serbia & Montenegro (2003), Venezuela (2005), Indonesia 
(2005), Sweden (2005), Afghanistan (2006), Libya (2006), Kuwait (2007), Kuwait (2007), 
Union of the Comoros (2008), Eritrea (2008), Cyprus (2009). Vietnam (2009), Kenya (2009). 
Gambia (2007). Id.  
93. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS 
AND COMMENTARY 10 (2005).   
94. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran] 1358 [1980], art. 77.  
95. Qanuni Madani [Civil Code] Tehran 1314 [1935], art. 9.  
96. See Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 92.  
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Protection of Investment of Venezuela refers to the consent to ICSID. 
The Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, however, reads the 
provision differently. In Cemex v. Venezuela and Brandeis v. 
Venezuela, the Tribunal believed that “a sovereign state’s 
interpretation of its own unilateral consent to the jurisdiction of an 
international tribunal is not binding on the tribunal or determinative of 
jurisdictional issues.” 97 
 The above-mentioned cases are concerning interpretation of 
consent. In Iran’s BITs, there is explicit consent to arbitration. But, in 
case of arbitration, the Iranian Government might challenge the 
jurisdiction of the arbitration based on the fact that the Assembly 
never ratified the BIT. In CSOB v. Slovakia, the BIT between the 
countries never came into force.98 In this case, because there was a 
reference to arbitration in the investment agreement, the tribunal 
found sufficient ground for jurisdiction.99 Some authors believe that 
the BITs consent clause is only “an offer to investors that need to be 
accepted.”100 Therefore, without an investment agreement referring to 
arbitration, the consent is not perfected. However, this approach does 
not seem be correct. As long as there is an unambiguous consent to 
arbitration, contrary domestic legal rules cannot constrain it. The 
approach is concordant with the Pacta Sunt Servanda principle.101 
Additionally, arbitration bodies tend to prioritize international law 
over national law. The reason is obvious. Investors rely on BITs and 
investment laws and are not necessarily aware of the intricacies of all 
domestic laws. With the act of investment, they already perfected the 
consent for referral of the disputes to arbitration. Therefore, it does 

97. Cemex Caracas Inve B.v. & Cemex Caracas II Inv. B.V v. Bolivarian Republic 
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Dec. 30, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0142.pdf; see also Brandes 
Investment Partners, LP v. Venez, supra note 84,  ¶ 105. 
98. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. the Slov., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4 
(1999). Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 27 (May 24, 1999). 
99. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. the Slov., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4 
(1999).  Decision of the Tribunal on Respondent’s Further and Partial Objection to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 27 (Dec. 1, 2000), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC558_En&caseId=C160.  
100. Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 830, 864-66 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
101. Pacta sunt servanda, or the principle of sanctity of contracts is best reflected in 
Article 26 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna Convention, supra 
note 75; see also, MARK EUGEN VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 363-68 (2009).  
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not seem that the barrier of Iran’s Constitution can hinder the 
jurisdiction of the arbitration body. 
 1. Content Analysis 
Precursors to BITs were the Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation treaties (FCN).102 The principal objective of FCNs was to 
facilitate trade and navigation. They were not specifically designed 
for investment. However, they contained three main components of 
modern BITs, namely treatment provisions, expropriation, and 
exchange control.103 FCN, however, contained a broad range of issues 
including right of entry, access to local courts, tax issues, treatment of 
products, custom treatment, technical experts, and many more.104 
Gradually, these diverse issues became subject to different treaties 
and resolutions, and investment became the subject of BITs. 
Additionally, on August 15, 1955 the United States in signed a FCN 
treaty with Iran.105  
According to some scholars, there are four possible ways that 
BITs relate to investment.106 They protect, liberalize, promote, or 
regulate them. The majority of BITs, however, focus on protection of 
investment because it implicitly promotes investment as well. BITs 
rarely tend to regulate investment since it might defeat their purpose 
to encourage investment. Regulations of specific investments occur in 
the contract between the investor and the host state. BITs typically 
incorporate four major components:107 1) general treatment of 
investment and investors: in this part of the BITs, government 
commits themselves to national treatment, the most favorite nation, 
fair and equitable treatment and also the umbrella clause.  2) 
Standards related to expropriation: In these clauses, government 
usually commits themselves to compensate the investor in the case of 

102. MUTHUCUMARASWAM SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 180-82 (2010).  
103. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United 
States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 207 (1988).  
104. Rudolf Dolzer & Margaret Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, in FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 47, 47 (Bishop et al. eds., 2005);  REISMAN ET AL., supra note 93. 
105. This FCN has been invoked in many occasions since the aftermath of Revolution in 
Iran. One of these occasions was in the case before International Court of Justice on US Navy 
attacks on some Iranian oil platforms.  Both sides invoked this treaty to support their conduct. 
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I. C. J. 161, ¶¶ 31-34 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
106. VANDEVELDE, supra note 91, at 5. 
107. REISMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 10-11; Vandevelde, supra note 103, at 202.  
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nationalization and expropriation. The compensation typically is 
calculated based on the fair market value of the investment. 3) 
Provisions related to the free transfer of currency, investment and its 
interests both in and outside the country: Countries impose different 
currency policies and limitations on the amount exported on foreign 
currencies. The BITs guarantee free transfer of foreign currency for 
investors. 4) Arbitration Clauses: an important part of almost all BITs, 
which is pivotal to the attraction of foreign investment, is the dispute 
settlement mechanism. Foreign investors tend to be skeptical about 
national courts deciding cases related to its government measures.108 
They prefer arbitration bodies to mainly adjudicate based on 
international laws and standards.  
Iran’s model BIT contains 15 articles and a preamble.109 Article 
1 concerns the definition of investment.110 Investment includes: ‘a) 
movable and immovable property b) shares or any kind of 
participation in companies c) money and/or receivables d) industrial 
and intellectual property such as patent, utility models, designs or 
models, trade marks and names, know-how and goodwill e) rights to 
search for, extract or exploit natural resources’. There are three ways 
investment can be enumerated in investment laws: asset-based model 
(which lists the assets subject to protection), transaction-based model 
(which lists the transactions investor make), and enterprise-based 
model (which lists business organizations investor can form).111 The 
model Iranian BIT, according to the definition of investment, follows 
an‘asset-based’ approach. Article 1 also defines investors, which 
includes natural as well as legal persons.  
Article 2 promotes investment.112 As long as the investment is 
within Iran’s law and regulations, the investment is subject to 
protection. Article 3 mentions admission of investment, meaning each 
contracting party shall provide necessary permits to investors.113 
Article 4 deals with protection of investment.114 Paragraph One of 
Article 4 declares: “Investment . . . shall receive the host Contracting 

108. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Three Laws of International Investment: National, 
Contractual, and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital, 151-52 (2013).  
109. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 479-84.  
110. Id. at 479.  
111. Engela C. Schlemmer, Investment, Investor, Nationality, and Shareholders, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 100, at 52. 
112. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 480.  
113. Id.  
114. Id. at 480-81.  
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Party’s full legal protection and fair treatment not less favorable than 
that accorded to investors of any third state who are in a comparable 
situation.”115 
This provision sets two important treatment components of 
BITs: fair and equitable treatment and the most favorite nation (MFN) 
clause. In Paragraph Two, however, the special privileges conferred 
for free trade, custom union, and common market to other states are 
excluded from the MFN clause. Article 5 extends the MFN clause to 
the provisions of other agreements as well.116 In other words, 
investors can “cherry pick” different favorable provisions from 
different agreements each contracting party concluded with other 
investors.117 Article 6 is about expropriation:  
“1. Investment of natural and legal persons of either Contracting 
Party shall not be nationalized, confiscated, expropriated or 
subjected to similar measures by the other Contracting Party 
except such measures are taken for public purposes, in 
accordance with due process of law, in a non-discrimination 
manner, and effective and appropriate compensation is 
envisaged. The amount of compensation shall be paid without 
delay.”118 
 Hence, expropriation is allowed if it is for public purposes. 
This is in line with recent BITs of the United States.119 The term 
‘public purpose’ is rather vague in this context. But, Iranian BITs, 
similar to new generations of BITs, emphasize two aspects of due 
process and compensation without delay in the case of expropriation. 
The BIT model of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not explicitly 
refer to indirect expropriation. Indirect expropriation might occur in 
cases such as levying burdensome taxation. Some BITs, such as ones 

115. Id. at 480.  
116. Id. at 481.  
117. A few Iranian BITs have more detailed provisions on MFN and national treatment. 
For instance Iran-Germany BIT Article 3(b) mentions: “The following shall, in particular, be 
deemed "treatment less favorable" within the meaning of Paragraph 1 of this Article: unequal 
treatment in the case of restrictions on the purchase of raw or auxiliary materials, of energy or 
fuel or of means of production or operation of any kind, unequal treatment in the case of 
impeding the marketing of products inside or outside the country, as well as any other 
measures having similar effects.”  
118. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 481.  
119. Vandevelde, supra note 103, at 231-32. Regarding compensation for expropriation 
it talks about US approach, which is derived from in Secretary of State Cordell Hull approach: 
“The BIT… incorporates the traditional United States view of international law, requiring 
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriated property.” Id.  
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with Switzerland, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the language of the BITs 
are more explicit regarding indirect expropriation: “Neither of the 
Contracting Parties shall take, either directly and indirectly, measures 
of expropriation or nationalization against investments . . . .”120 
Article 7 deals with national treatment in losses caused by war, 
armed conflict, revolution, and similar state of emergency.121 The 
third main components in BITs are referred to in Article 8, which is 
about repatriation and transfer.122 Each contracting state should permit 
transfers related to investment in returns, proceeds from the sale, 
royalties, and loan installment among others.  Article 9 sets the 
framework for cases of subrogation.123 Article 10 talks about 
observance of commitment and Article 11 deals with the scope of the 
agreement.124 The fourth component of BITs, which is dispute 
settlement, is discussed in Articles 12 and 13.125  
 2. Arbitration Clauses 
Iranian BITs, similar to other leading countries BITs, stipulate 
two occasions for arbitration.126 One is when the contracting parties 
disagree on the interpretation or application of the BIT. In this case, 
model BITs suggest that each contracting party appoint an arbitrator 

120. Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Mar. 8, 1998, UNCTAD.ORG, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_iran.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 
2014); see Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the 
Government of the Republic of Belarus and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
July 14, 1995, UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/iran_belarus.pdf 
(last visited, Mar 3, 2014); see Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 1996, UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iia/docs/bits/kazakhstan_iran.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
121. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 481. 
122. Id. at 481-90.  
123. Id. at 482.  
124. Id.  
125. Id. at 482-84.  
126. For instance Article 12 of the Iranian Model BIT deals with the arbitration for 
settlement of disputes between the host government and investor(s) while Article 13 stipulates 
arbitration for settlement of disputes between contracting parties as to interpretation and 
application of the treaty. Id.; see also Roberto Echandi, Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Investment Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Recent Developments in Investment 
Rulemaking, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 3, 24 
(2010) (“These IIAs [i.e., international investment agreements] contain provisions that grant 
specialized competent authorities of the Contracting Parties the right to make interpretations of 
certain matters or provisions of the agreement, which will be binding for the arbitral tribunal.”) 
2014] COMBATTING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1761 
within sixty days. The parties’ arbitrators appoint the umpire. In the 
case of the refusal of one party, upon request, the President of the 
International Court of Justice appoints the arbitrator for the failing 
party.127  The cost of the arbitration will be split equally between the 
parties and the decision of the arbitration is binding.  
Article 12 deals with cases of dispute between a contracting 
party and investor of the other contracting party.128 In this case, each 
party has to wait six months “from the date of notification of the 
claim by one party to the other.” This intervening period allows 
parties to think twice about their legal claims and possibly reach an 
amicable settlement. If a dispute refers to the tribunal prior to the six 
months, then the dispute is rejected based on an admissibility ground 
and not jurisdiction. The mechanism of appointing the arbitration 
tribunal resembles that of the Article 13. The only difference is that it 
is the Secretary of General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that 
appoints the arbitrator for the failing party.129 The arbitration clause of 
Iranian BITs also contains the fork in the road clause.130 This clause 
basically requires the investor to choose between the domestic and 
arbitration tribunal. Investors cannot pursue their claims in both 
national and international tribunals. Paragraph 3 and 4 of Article 12 
declare:  
“A dispute primarily referred to the competent courts of the host 
Contracting Party, as long as it is pending, cannot be referred to 
arbitration save with the parties agreement; and in the event that 
a final judgment is rendered, it cannot be referred to arbitration. 
National courts shall not have jurisdiction over any dispute 
referred to arbitration. However, the provisions of this paragraph 

127. IRANIAN MODEL BIT, supra note 61, at 483-84. “In case the umpire is to be 
appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice, if the President of the 
International Court of Justice is prevented from carrying out the said function or if he is a 
national of either Contracting Party, the appointment shall be made by the vice-president of the 
International Court of Justice, and if the vice-president is also prevented from carrying out the 
said function or he is a national of either Contracting Party, the appointment shall be made by 
the senior member of the said court who is not a national of either Contracting Party.” Id.  
128. Id. at 482-83.  
129. Id. at 483 (“In the event that each party fails to appoint its arbitrator within the 
mentioned period and/or the appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the umpire, each of the 
parties may request the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to appoint the 
failing party’s arbitrator or the umpire, as the case maybe.”). 
130. Id. at 482-83.  
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do not bar the winning party to seek for the enforcement of the 
arbitral award before national courts.”131 
The BITs Iran has concluded with countries is sometimes 
slightly different from the Model BIT. Starting from the waiting 
period, it ranges from three to six months.132 Some Iranian BITs 
require a detailed notification of the claim from the investor to the 
contracting party.133 Interestingly enough, for a few Iranian BITs, 
there is no fork in the road clause. For example, in Iran-Greece and 
Iran-Switzerland there is no specific provision in cases where disputes 
are pursued in national courts.134 A few others, however, explicitly 
forbid national courts from investigating disputes between investors 
and other governments.135 Iran has concluded a few BITs that 
stipulate a waiver of local proceedings clause.136 This is similar to the 
NAFTA article 1121(1)(b), which requires written waiver of the right 
of investors to seek local remedies in case they pick NAFTA 
arbitration.137 For instance, in the Iran-Germany BIT there is a waiver 
clause with similar requirement.138  

131. Id. at 483. 
132. Atai, supra note 62, at 135. In the Iran-Croatia BIT, the waiting period is twelve 
months.  
133. Id. at 136. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Iran-Spain, 2002, UNCTAD.ORG,  http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain_
iran.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (declaring “Disputes that may arise . . . shall be notified in 
writing including a detailed information, by the investor to the former Contracting Party.”).  
134. See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Greece-
Iran, March 13, 2001, UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/greece_iran.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
135. Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austria-Iran, 
Feb. 15, 2001, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/193 
[hereinafter AUSTRIA-IRAN BIT]. Paragraph Seven of Article 11 of Iran-Austria BIT, for 
instance, declares: “National courts shall not have jurisdiction over any dispute referred to 
arbitration. However, the provisions of this paragraph do not bar the winning party to seek for 
the enforcement of the arbitral award before national courts.” Id. at 10. 
136. Atai, supra note 62, at 137.  
137. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1121(b), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1983), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-112.asp  
(emphasis added) (“(b) The investor and, where the claim is for loss or damage to an interest in 
an enterprise of another Party that is a juridical person that the investor owns or controls 
directly or indirectly, the enterprise, waive their right to initiate or continue before any 
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement 
procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged 
to be a breach referred to in Article 1116, except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or 
other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages, before an administrative 
tribunal or court under the law of the disputing Party”).   
138. Bilateral Investment Treaty, Iran-Ger. art. 11(3) (2005) (“In the event an investor of 
a contracting party has submitted a dispute to the local competent court the dispute may be 
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Arbitration clauses in BITs can take different forms depending 
on the forum parties choose for arbitration.139 In general, there are two 
main types of arbitration tribunals: permanent and ad hoc.140 ICSID, 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, and even Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
are examples of permanent arbitration bodies.141 There is an 
increasing tendency to refer the disputes to ICSID in investment 
disputes.142 Since Iran is not yet a member to ICSID, the arbitration 
clause primarily refers to ad hoc arbitration. However, there are a few 
BITs that refer to ICSID jurisdiction.143 In Iran-Korea, Iran-France, 
Iran-Greece, Iran-Austria, and Iran-Italy BITs, investors have multiple 
options, including ICSID.144 Article 11 of Iran-Austria BIT stipulates 
that: 
“2. In the event that such a dispute cannot be settled as provided 
in paragraph 1 of this Article the investor in question may, at his 
choice, submit the dispute for settlement to: 
(a) The competent court of the Contracting Party, which is a 
party to the dispute; 
(b) An ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal, in compliance with the 
arbitration rules of the UN Commission on the International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL); 
(c) The International Chamber of Commerce under its rules of 
arbitration; 
(d) The International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, for the implementation of the arbitration procedure under 
the Washington Convention of 18 March 1965, on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, if 
or as soon as both Contracting Parties have acceded to it; 

referred to international arbitration provided the party submitting the dispute to arbitration 
bears the costs of the proceedings so far incurred and the court has not yet rendered a judgment 
in substance, if so required.”).  
139. See REISMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at Chapter 4.  
140. Cesare P.R. Romano et al., Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues, 
and Players, in the OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 3, 10 (2013).  
141. Id. at 11.  
142. Id. at 298.  
143. Atai, supra note 62, at 142-43.  
144. Agreement for the Promotion and the Protection of Investments, Iran-S. Kor., Oct. 
31, 1998, UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/rep%20korea_
iran.PDF (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Decree 
No. 2004-1279, Fr.-Iran, May 12, 2003, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/1232; see AUSTRIA-IRAN BIT, supra note 135. 
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(e) Any other dispute settlement procedure agreed upon by the 
parties to the dispute. 
4. Each Contracting Party hereby consents to the submission of 
investment disputes to the court and international Arbitrations 
mentioned above.”145 
Interestingly enough, the moment Iran decides to join ICSID, it 
will already have concluded BITs with a few countries that include 
ICSID arbitration. Also, it explicitly consents to ICSID jurisdiction.146  
Ad hoc arbitration tribunal, furthermore, can have different 
arbitral regimes. Some are following UNCITRAL arbitration rules 
and some do not. In Iran, the majority of BITs cases do not refer to 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules. In a few, such as Iran-Poland, Iran-
Belarus, Iran-Lebanon, Iran-Austria and Iran-Italy there is a provision 
on the governance of UNCITRAL.147 The ad hoc arbitration tribunal 
should follow UNCITRAL arbitration rules in its procedure. In other 
Iranian BITs, however, there is no provision regarding the governing 
rules of the ad hoc arbitration tribunal. In this case, as Article 12 
Paragraph Six of Iran-China BIT stipulates “the ad hoc tribunal shall 
determine its own procedure and the place of arbitration.” 148 In other 
words, in these ad hoc arbitration tribunals, the arbitrators design the 
governing procedure rules.149 

145. AUSTRIA-IRAN BIT, supra note 135. 
146. Atai, supra note 62, at 142-43. 
147. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Iran-Leb., 
October 28, 1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1654; e.g., 
Paragraph B of Article 8 of Iran-Italy BIT (“b) an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal, in compliance with 
the arbitration rules of the UN Commission on the International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); the 
host Contracting Party undertakes hereby to accept the reference to said arbitration.”); 
Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Belr.-Iran, July 14, 
1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/302; see AUSTRIA-IRAN 
BIT, supra note 135. 
148. Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, China-Iran, 
June 22, 2000, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/744 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
149. RESIMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 435-43 (arguing Sapphire Int’l Petroleum v 
National Iranian Oil Co. 35 I.L.R 136 (1936) is an example of this type of ad hoc arbitration 
tribunal).  
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III. COMBATTING SANCTIONS  
A. The Nature of International Economic Sanctions  
 International sanctions are a reality in international affairs and 
can be traced back to ancient Greece.150 Economic Sanctions aim to 
discontinue the economic benefits, which a specific country is 
receiving from its foreign trade. Economic sanctions serve as an 
essential foreign policy tool to alter the behavior of a targeted state. 
Imposition of international sanctions is the most important form of 
countermeasures in international law for punishing a wrongdoing 
state. Since the collapse of the bipolar system, the world has 
witnessed a significant growth in economic sanctions, partially due to 
the unprecedented inter-connectedness of today’s economy, which 
has facilitated the imposition of economic sanctions.151  
 Yet, there is an inherent conflict in the theory of economic 
sanctions. Scholars have attempted to justify it based on the theory of 
‘outcasting’.152 International actors boycott a wrongdoing actor until it 
decides to change its behavior. However, the theory of economic 
outcasting remains at conflict with the mainstream perspectives on 
international dynamics and relations. The theory behind economic 
sanction is at odds from liberalism that endorses economic 
engagement as a principal means for conflict resolution.153 Boycotting 
a state would likely result in aggravation of conflict since a downturn 
of economic factors weakens the middle class base required for 
pressure on states. On the other hand, following realism, another 

150. KERN ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LAW & POLICY 8 (2009) (“Athens, 
imposed economic sanctions in 432 BC when Pericles issued the Megarian import embargo 
against Greek city-states which has refused to join the Athenian-led Delian League during 
Peloponnesian War.”). 
151. P. EDWARD HALEY, STRATEGIES OF DOMINANCE: THE MISDIRECTION OF U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY 5 (2006) (“American primacy gave the United States unprecedented freedom 
of action and brought coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions into the paradigm with 
much greater frequency . . . .”).  
152. Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and 
International Law, 121 YALE L. J. 252, 302 (2011-2012). Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro 
argue that international law is law because it enforces its obligations through outcasting: “very 
little of international law meets the Modern State Conception of international law—very little 
(if any) of it is enforced through brute physical force deployed by an institution enforcing its 
own rules. But what is interesting is not so much what international law is not, but what it is. 
And that is law that operates almost entirely through outcasting and external enforcement.” Id.  
153. JOHN MACMILLIAN, ON LIBERAL PEACE: DEMOCRACY, WAR AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 114-24 (1998). 
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major paradigm of international relations, economic sanctions would 
not end in favorable results since sanctions eliminate cooperation by 
isolating the wrongdoer. Recurrent and long-tem interactions between 
states foster a rational-based cooperation even among hostile states, 
according to realism.154 Following this logic, isolation of states 
reduces interaction between states and dis-incentivizes the isolated 
state to reciprocate. This eliminates the possibility of cooperation, a 
matter, which is in conflict with the end goal of economic, sanctions: 
to compel the targeted state to cooperate. Finally, from a 
constructivism standpoint, isolation would result in deprivation from 
international society norms. Constructivist paradigm emphasizes on 
the non-physical and ideational aspects of international relations.155 
Evidently isolation of a specific state prevents it from adopting or 
adhering to any of the shared values of international community. In 
short, it is not clear whether economic sanctions exert desired impact 
on targeted states and fulfill its promises. As shown, theoretically, 
economic outcasting suffers from internal incoherence.156  
In the Iran case, the new deal has been cherished as a successful 
case of economic sanctions that brought a “rogue state” to the serious 
negotiation talks.157 It is hard to measure the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions. Some studies find it to be an effective way of 
changing the behavior of states, if properly implemented.158 Some do 

154. ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 60-63 (1984).  Axelrod 
offers an elaborate explanation of how cooperation merge in an international setting in which 
anarchy is the constitute logic. His question is under what conditions cooperation emerges in a 
world with no central authority and rationalist state-actors. In his seminal work he uses the 
prisoner dilemma game to show that long-term interaction would foster and stabilize 
cooperation. He refers to the “live-and-let-live system” of World War I, to show that even in 
times of war, long-term interaction would eventuate in some levels of cooperation. See id.   
155. Constructivists endeavor to infuse the development of social sciences into the 
traditional rigid literature of international relations, Vendulka Kubalkova et al., Constructing 
Constructivism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CONSTRUCTED WORLD 3, 36-38 (1998). 
156. See generally Farshad Ghodoosi, The Sanctions Theory: A Frail Paradigm for 
International Law? (on file with the author). 
157. Jim Sciutto, Senators Propose New Iran Sanctions Bill: White House Opposed, 
CNN (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/19/politics/iran-sanctions-senate/.  For 
instance, Robert Mendez, a New Jersey Democrat Senator, declared “current sanctions brought 
Iran to the negotiating table.” That was the reasoning behind his bi-partisan proposal to step up 
the level of pressure on Iran through enacting further economic sanctions. See id. 
158. See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
RECONSIDERED (2009). 
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not.159 Iran’s case is no exception. It is very hard to gauge the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions in Iran’s case.  
Yet, recent rhetoric has centered on the fact that economic 
sanctions have been working and that the change in Iran’s behavior 
came as a result of crippling economic sanctions. However, before 
one can conclude such a general statement, it is helpful to look at 
following facts:  
1. Sanctions showed their strongest teeth from 2010 onwards. A 
web of economic sanctions imposed by the UN, the US and the EU 
aimed to strangle the Iranian economy, provoked social unrests and 
halted the Iranian Government’s enrichment activity.160 The Iranian 
economy suffered tremendously as a result of sanctions. The Rial, the 
Iranian currency, lost almost 200% of its value.161 The sale of oil also 
dropped from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to 1 million barrels 
per day in 2013.162 Yet, there is little evidence showing that the 
Iranian government suffered as result of these sanctions.163 As a 
Rentier State,164 those with special privileges continued to import and 

159. See generally ERNEST H. PREEG, FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD WITH 
SANCTIONS: UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST (1999).  
160. Nader Habibi, The Iranian Economy in the Shadow of Sanctions, in IRAN AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY: PETRO POPULISM, ISLAM AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 172, 172-74 
(Parvin Alizadeh & Hassan Hakimian eds., 2014).  
161. Steven Plaut, The Collapse of Iran’s Rial, GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Feb. 21, 2013, 
5:00 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3597/iran-rial-collpase. 
162. See Sanctions, IRAN MATTERS: BEST ANALYSIS AND FACTS ON THE IRANIAN 
NUCLEAR CHALLENGE FROM HARVARD’S BELFER CENTER, available at http://
iranmatters.belfercenter.org/sanctions (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (providing  a concise review 
of the impact of economic sanctions on Iran’s economy).  
163. See, e.g., Oren Dorell, Iran Nuclear Sanctions Hurt the Middle Class, not Guards, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-11-
17/iran-nuclear-sanctions-backfire/51275666/1; Beheshteh Farshneshani, In Iran, Sanctions 
Hurt the Wrong People, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/roomfordebate/2013/11/19/sanctions-successes-and-failures/in-iran-sanctions-hurt-the-wrong-
people; Jamal Abdi & Trita Parsi, Opinion: Sanctions Against Iran Hurt the People, Not the 
Regime, NEWSDAY (Aug. 5, 2012), http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/sanctions-against-
iran-hurt-the-people-not-the-regime-opinion-1.3881126; Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi & 
Muhammad Sahimi, The Sanctions Aren’t Working, FOREIGN POLICY (July 5, 2012), available 
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/05/the_sanctions_aren_t_working. 
164. “Rentier States are defined here as those countries that receive on a regular basis 
substantial mounts [sic] of external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by 
foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a 
given country…a moment’s reflection will reveal that oil revenues received by the 
governments of the oil exporting countries can also be external rents…the governments of the 
oil exporting countries in the Middle East benefit from differential and monopolistic rents that 
arise from higher productivity of the Middle Eastern oilfields and price fixing practices of the 
oil companies.” Hossein Mahdavi, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in 
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export from a black market, this time even without any strong 
competitors from the Iranian domestic market.  
2. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, there have been several 
periods of social unrest,165 the last of which followed the June 2009 
election.166 As far as analyses show, none of these social unrests had a 
strong economic motive behind them: the Reformist Movement of 
1997-2001 has political goals including promotion of democracy, rule 
of law as well as establishing a robust civil society.167 During student 
protests in 1999 the main request was political in nature too, i.e. 
request for freedom.168 In 2009, the crowd gathered in the streets 
because of their objection to the result of the election.169 However, no 
major social unrests have been reported since the 2010 
implementation of “crippling sanctions.”170  
3. Economic sanctions also seem to be ineffective in halting 
nuclear enrichment activity of the Iranian Government. With 190 
centrifuges before the sanctions, Iran extended its program to 19000 
centrifuges following the 2010 sanctions.171 It seems that the 
sanctions came nowhere close to crippling the enrichment activity of 
the Iranian government. 

Rentier States: The Case of Iran, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE 
EAST: FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY 428, 428-29 (M.A. Cook ed., 1970) 
(footnote omitted).  
165. See generally SIMIN FADAEE, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN IRAN: ENVIRONMENTALISM 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2012).  
166. See, e.g., Nazila Fathi & Michael Slackman, Iran Stepping Up Effort to Quell 
Election Protest, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/25/world/middleeast/25iran.html?_r=0; Timeline: Iran’s Post Eleciton Protests, FIN. 
TIMES (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/533d966e-755a-11df-
a7e2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GN4X6ujT. 
167. MAJID MOHAMMADI, JUDICIAL REFORM AND REORGANIZATION IN 20TH CENTURY 
IRAN: STATE-BUILDING, MODERNIZATION AND ISLAMICIZATION 184 (2008).  
168. Student Protests Shake Iran’s Government, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/11/world/student-protests-shake-iran-s-government.html.  
169. Robert F. Worth & Nazila Fathi, Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes 
Vote, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/
middleeast/14iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
170. Akbar Ganji, US Crippling Sanctions Against Iran: A New Wave of Anti-
Americanism (Part I), HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
akbar-ganji/us-crippling-sanctions-ag_b_3860933.html. 
171. See Iran’s Nuclear Timetable, IRAN WATCH: TRACKING IRAN’S UNCONVENTIONAL 
WEAPON CAPABILITIES (Feb. 21, 2014), available at http://www.iranwatch.org/our-
publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable (providing a quick overview of progress 
of Iran’s nuclear program). 
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4. Long before the recent stringent sanctions, Western countries 
had a better deal with Iran in 2003: total suspension of enrichment 
activity, not for 6 months but indefinitely (see Tehran Declaration).172  
There was no discussion of the “right to enrichment” either. It was 
simply a better deal from the Western countries perspective.173 After 
almost 10 years, with crippling sanctions in place, Iran is not 
suspending its entire enrichment,174 and also in one reading, its “right 
to enrichment” is actually implicitly recognized.175 After all, the 
comprehensive deal-to-come should “involve[] a mutually defined 
(uranium) enrichment program.”176  
This Section aimed to show that economic sanctions do not 
enjoy having a well-founded theoretical base. In Iran’s case also there 
are serious doubts as to whether economic sanctions resulted in the 
desired outcome.  
B. International Sanctions Imposed on Iran  
In addition to some major legal shortcomings in the Iranian legal 
system, the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, European 
Union, and US Congress has complicated the investment in Iran even 
further. The increasing sanctions on Iran have mainly been due to it 
controversial nuclear program.177 These sanctions are so broad and 
far-reaching that they might even cover minor transactions related to 
personal property located in Iran.178 US sanctions on Iran apply to all 

172. See Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers, INT’L 
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (Oct. 21, 2003), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/
statement_iran21102003.shtml. In 2003, a nuclear agreement reached between Iran and three 
European countries, i.e., England, France, and Germany. In a trip to Tehran they signed a deal 
with Iran in which Iran pledged to suspend its nuclear enrichment, which it did. Id.  
173. See Trita Parsi, No, Sanctions Didn’t Force Iran to Make a Deal, FOREIGN POLICY 
(May 14, 2014), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/14/sanctions_
did_not_force_iran_to_make_a_deal_nuclear_enrichment. 
174.  See id.  
175. Mark Fitzpatrick, Assessing the Iranian Nuclear Deal, THE INT’L INSTITUTE FOR 
STRATEGIC STUD. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2014-0f13/
february-e91c/assessing-the-iranian-nuclear-deal-076e. 
176. Preamble, Joint Plan of Action (Nov. 24, 2013), available at http://eeas.europa.eu/
statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf. 
177. A brief history of Iran’s Sanctions can be found at the Iran Matters website from 
Harvard’s Belfer Center. See Sanctions, IRAN MATTERS: BEST ANALYSIS AND FACTS ON THE 
IRANIAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE, available at http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/sanctions (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
178. Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2012). 
“560.206   Prohibited trade-related transactions with Iran; goods, technology, or services. 
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US persons and entities even abroad.179 The violation of sanctions 
will have severe penalties including up to twenty years in prison and 
up to US$1,000,000 in fines.180  
 The United Nation Security Council has passed multiple 
resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In 2006, resolution 
number 1696 basically urged Iran to conform to the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty and re-engage itself with the international 
community.181 This resolution demands Iran to “suspend all 
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and 
development.”182 It expresses its intention to take further measures in 
the case of non-compliance to persuade Iran to change its behavior. 
Again in December 2006, the Security Council passed another 
resolution concerning Iran’s nuclear program (Resolution number 
1737).183  This Resolution prevents supply, sale, and transfer of “all 
items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology which could 
contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing and heavy water-
related activities” of Iran.184 This broad provision does not specify the 
criteria or the goods that might be employed in Iran’s nuclear 
activities. Therefore, the decisions regarding the types of goods, 
which fall under this resolution, could be subjective. Paragraph 
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(a) Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, and notwithstanding any contract 
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to May 7, 1995, no United States 
person, wherever located, may engage in any transaction or dealing in or related to:  
  (1) Goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of  
  Iran; or 
  (2) Goods, technology, or services for exportation, re-exportation, sale or supply, 
directly or indirectly, to Iran or the Government of Iran.  
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the term transaction or dealing includes 
but is not limited to purchasing, selling, transporting, swapping, brokering, approving, 
financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing.” Id. 
179. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14, 110 Stat. 1541 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note) (“(18) United States person. The term ‘United 
States person’ means “(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States or who owes 
permanent allegiance to the United States; and (B) a corporation or other legal entity which is 
organized under the laws of the United States, any State or territory thereof, or the District of 
Columbia, if natural persons described in subparagraph (A) own, directly or indirectly, more 
than 50 percent of the outstanding capital stock or other beneficial interest in such legal entity. 
”). 
180. An Overview of Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations Involving Sanctions 
against Iran, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.txt (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
181. See S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 2 U.N. Doc S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006). 
182. Id.   
183. S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006). 
184. Id.  
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Twelve talks about the freeze of funds, assets and economic 
resources, which provide support to Iran’s proliferation. An exception 
to this provision is Paragraph Fifteen, which declares, “measures in 
Paragraph Twelve shall not prevent a designated person or entity from 
making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing 
of such person or entity”.185 Even in this case, the contract should 
concern the materials, goods and assistance to Iran’s enrichment 
activities.  
 Resolution 1747 (2007) does not entail significant general 
sanctions. It requests a report from the Director General of the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) to make decisions regarding 
the implementation of further sanctions.186 For the first time, it 
explicitly names entities that are involved in nuclear or ballistic 
missile activities.187 The resolution promises many incentives 
including “improve[ement] of Iran’s access to the international 
economy, market and capital” upon Iran’s change of behavior in its 
nuclear program.188 In Resolution 1803 (2008), the United Nation 
Security Council expands the measures in Resolution 1737 (2006) to 
more entities enumerated in the Annexes of the Resolution.189  From 
paragraphs nine to thirteen, it also calls upon all states,  to “exercise 
vigilance” for “public provided financial support for trade with 
Iran.”190 This includes exports, financial services and other pertinent 
services. Yet, this is a request for caution so that support and 
investment do not “contribut[e] to the proliferation of sensitive 
nuclear activities.”191 The latest resolution dates back to 2010 
(Resolution number 1929).192 It confirms that Iran has failed to 
comply with the requirement of IAEA.193 It asks the states to require 
their nationals and legal entities to exercise full vigilance when it 
comes to “doing business” with Iran.194 Furthermore, it calls upon 
states “to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial 
institutions”195 to open offices and subsidiaries or banking account in 

185. Id. ¶ 15.  
186. S.C. Res. 1747, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007). 
187. Id. at Annex 1.  
188. Id.  
189. See S.C. Res. 1803, Annex I, II, III U.N. Doc S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008). 
190. Id. ¶¶ 9-13. 
191. S.C. Res. 1803, ¶¶ 9-13 U.N. Doc S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008). 
192. See S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010). 
193. Id. ¶ 1.  
194. Id. ¶ 22.  
195. Id. ¶ 24.  
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Iran if they have information that these activities will contribute to 
Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.196 This Resolution 
establishes a ‘Panel of Experts’ to monitor the implementation of 
measures mentioned in Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 
(2008).197  
The US Congress also passed multiple acts concerning Iran’s 
sanctions. From the Carter presidency until the Obama administration, 
sanctions have become increasingly all encompassing.198 Both 
imports to and exports from Iran have become extremely legally 
restrictive.199 Dealing in Iranian-origin goods by a US person is in 
violation of US sanctions.200 Imports from Iran are limited to cases 
such as gifts valued at $100.201 Exports to Iran, in the form of goods 
or services, are also banned.202 Any new investment in any form 
including funds and assets are prohibited.203 In certain cases, OFAC 
(Office of Foreign Asset Control) may issue a license for a limited 
period of time for a certain transaction.204 However, it seems that this 
license might be issued for minor and personal-related investment.205 
If even, under these sanctions, the US citizen knows or has reason to 
know such items are intended specifically for supply, transshipment, 
or re-expropriation to Iran, then he is subject to these sanctions as 
well.206 
 As it is obvious, all the sanctions have made it extremely hard 
for countries to invest in Iran. The sanctions have made direct 

196. S.C. Res. 1929, ¶¶ 21-24 U.N. Doc S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010). 
197. Id. ¶ 29.  
198. Year by year the US sanctions expanded on Iran. See Jason Starr & Heila Ighani, 
Timeline of U.S. Sanctions, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER, 
available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-sanctions .  
199. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
387, §7207, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000). 
200. See Iranian Transactions Regulations: Iranian-Origin Goods or Services; Goods or 
Services Owned or Controlled by The Government of Iran, 31 C.F.R. § 560.306 (1999).  
201. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.506 (1999).  
202. Id. § 560.204 
203. Id. § 560.207.  
204. Licenses can be issued for exports, financial dealings with Iran, transactions as well 
as for humanitarian causes. See An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations involving Sanctions 
against Iran, DEP’T OF THE U.S. TREASURY (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf. 
205. Id.  
206. Id.  
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investment in Iran almost impossible (even though Iran is in dire need 
of foreign investment, especially in its energy sector).207  
The European Union is a latecomer in the area of international 
sanctions in general and in the case of Iran as well.208 The European 
Union realizes that the only major foreign policy tool it holds is 
economic pressure.209 The European Union mainly enacts regulations 
based on the UN Security Council resolutions.210 The main reason for 
this is that the EU desires to avoid any inconsistencies as to the 
interpretation given to the Security Council resolution by its 
individual members.211 Furthermore, it is a faster process to 
implement Security Council resolutions via the EU legislative 
body.212 
Western European Countries, in contract to the US, favored 
diplomacy and negotiation for a significant amount of time. In 2007, 
the first signs of standoff emerged.213 In a joint statement in 2007, 
China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom showed 
serious concern over Iran’s nuclear program and agreed to finalize a 
text for a third UN sanction.214 In April of 2007, the Council 
Regulation No 423/2007 was passed to provide a measure to 
implement the UN Security Council 1737 (2006).215 In its annexes, 
the Regulation declares the prohibited goods and lists persons and 

207. Andrew Tochia, Iran Hopes for End of Sanctions Boom but Investors Still Wary, 
REUTERS (June 25, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/25/us-iran-investment-
analysis-idUSKBN0F018820140625. 
208. See Michael Brzoska, The Role of Sanctions in Non-Proliferation in ARMS 
CONTROL, in THE 21ST CENTURY: BETWEEN COERCION AND COOPERATION 123, 132 (Oliver 
Meier & Christopher Daase eds., 2013) (“The EU is a new actor in the field of sanctions.”). 
For long, EU preferred to simply support the UN Sanctions in forms of EU regulations. See id. 
However, under the pressure of the United States, EU started to implement regional sanctions 
against Iran from March 2007 onwards. See id.  
209. Anthonius W. de Vries & Hadewych Hazelzet, The EU as a New Actor on the 
Sanctions Scene, in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL 
SYSTEM 95, 95 (Peter Wallensteen et al. eds., 2005).  
210. See Brzoska, supra note 208.  
211. See de Vries & Hazelzet, supra note 209, at 96.  
212. Id. at 96.  
213. Brzoska, supra note 208. 
214. Joint Statement on Iran Sanctions, China-Fr.-Ger.-Russ.-U.K-U.S. (Sept. 28, 2007), 
available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/eu-p6jointstatementoniran-092807.
pdf. 
215. Council Regulation 423/2007, 2007 O.C. (L 103), available at http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/april/tradoc_134553.pdf (concerning restrictive measures 
against Iran). 
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entities subject to sanctions.216 Subsequently, the European Council 
updated and amended the regulation and expanded the list of goods 
and entities in the annexes.217 A few entities, including banks started 
to fight back against the EU sanctions resulting in 30 cases in EU’s 
General Court.218 Recently, the largest bank in Iran convinced the 
Court to order its removal from the list.219 The General Court agreed 
with Bank Saderat because there was not sufficient evidence proving 
the involvement of Bank Saderat with Iran’s nuclear program.220  
 In sum, Iran is subject to sanctions at three levels: US 
sanctions, which are the oldest of the three, UN sanctions, and EU 
sanctions (which is basically an implementation of UN sanctions). 
Each level of sanctions poses different and new challenges for arbitral 
tribunals.  
 C. Sanctions as Justification for Withdrawal   
 As discussed earlier, the Islamic Republic of Iran is currently 
the target of the toughest sanctions since the Islamic Revolution.221 
Many multinational companies that mainly invested in the oil and gas 
section have withdrawn their businesses due to the sanctions.222 It 
seems that Iran has not yet initiated any litigation invoking the 
arbitration clause in the bilateral investment treaties. Nevertheless, the 
question is whether the Security Council, the EU, and the US 
sanctions can exempt companies from fulfilling their obligations.   
 It is critical to distinguish between the national and 
international sanctions. In our context, both domestic legislation and 
the Security Council Resolutions affect the issue of investment in 
Iran. The current trend believes that the principal governing legal 

216. See id. at Annex II, III, IV.  
217. Restrict Measures (Sanctions) in Force, EUROPEAN UNION (Feb. 9, 2014), 
available at http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf (providing an updated 
list of sanctioned entities and individuals). 
218. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN ET AL., IRAN: SANCTIONS, ENERGY, ARMS CONTROL, 
AND REGIME CHANGE 45-47 (2014). 
219. See EU Court Rules for Second Time Against Iran Bank Sanctions, REUTERS (Feb. 
6, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/06/us-iran-sanctions-eu-idUSBRE9151422
0130206. 
220. Id.   
221. See Timeline of U.S. Sanctions, supra note 198.  
222. See Energy Firms to Quit Iran to Comply with US Sanctions, BBC (Sept. 30, 2010),  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11448952. 
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order of investment disputes is international law.223 In international 
law, there are certain norms, so-called jus cogens, which are non-
derogable and can trump other conflicting treaties.224 Some scholars 
posit that jus cogens norms are similar to mandatory rules in 
investment disputes and are obligatory.225 Moreover, the Security 
Council Resolutions are binding on member states regardless of other 
treaty obligations countries might have undertaken.226 Therefore, if, 
for example, the Security Council declares a resolution sanctioning an 
individual’s assets because he/she is funding piracy, the host state in 
which she invested should seize her assets regardless of its BIT 
provisions.227  
 Conceptually, jus cogens norms are clearly laid out in the 
Vienna Convention.228 Practically, however, it is not obvious which 
norms fall under its category. As Reisman points out, “the only jus 
cogens upon which the drafters of the Vienna Convention could agree 
was the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter.”229 Hence, resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program and 
the ensuing embargo hardly constitute any jus cogens norm, which 
companies can resort to in the case of a breach.230 On the other hand, 

223. See Ole Spiermann, Applicable Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 89, 102-07 (Peter Muchlinski ed., 2008).  
224. Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 53. “A treaty is void if, at the time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes 
of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.” Id.  
225. Donald Francis Donovan, Investment Treaty Arbitration, in MANDATORY RULES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 275, 278-79 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2011).  
226.  U.N. Charter art. 103. Article 103 of the UN Charter provides: “[i]n the event of a 
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under 
the present Charter shall prevail.” Id. 
227. Donovan, supra note 225. 
228. See Vienna Convention, supra note 75, at art. 53. (“A treaty is void if, at the time of 
its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the 
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.”). 
229. W. Michael Resiman, Report: Law, International Public Policy (So-called) and 
Arbitral Choice in International Commercial Arbitration, 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 849, 
855 (2007).  
230. Several international law scholars and tribunals have been wary of separating jus 
cogens and Security Council Resolutions so that the resolutions remain subject to jus cogens 
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however, pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter, any inconsistent 
treaty with the UN Charter is considered annulled.231 The Security 
Council resolutions are issued under the authorization of Chapter 
Seven of the UN Charter and possibly enjoy the same status as the 
UN Charter.232 Thus, obligations arising out of the UN Charter, 
especially those essential for the peace and security of the world 
(Chapter Seven), are binding on all states.233  
 In the context of Iran’s foreign investment, for instance, a 
company has to withdraw from performing its contractual obligation 
upon knowledge that its business contributes technology to Iran’s 
heavy water-related activities.234 The company can invoke Resolution 
number 1737 of the UN Security Council, which prohibits transfer of 
technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related 
activities.235 On the other hand, however, invoking EU or US 
sanctions, which are broader in scope, does not provide sufficient 
grounds for a company to discontinue its contractual obligations with 
Iran. Invoking US and EU sanctions is similar to invoking internal 
laws for justification of breach. As discussed earlier, neither party can 
resort to conflicting internal laws for the breach of a contract.236  
 D. Arbitral Review of Sanctions 
 Probably, the most important question for an arbitral tribunal 
adjudicating an investment dispute involving sanctions would be the 
extent of the reviewability of the sanctions. In other words, the issue 
is whether an arbitral tribunal can assess and review international 
sanctions. The United Nations Charter has strong language when 
dealing with obligations arising under Security Council decisions. 

norms. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-86 (1999); STUFYAN DROUBI, 
RESISTING UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 34-38 (2014); Erika De Wet, 
Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 541, 54-48 (2013).  
231. U.N. Charter art. 103.  
232. See ARTHUR WATTS & MICHAEL WOOD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
1999-2009: VOLUME IV: TREATIES, FINAL DRAFT ARTICLES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 749 
(2011) (footnote omitted) (“Even if the primacy of Security Council decisions under Article 
103 is not expressly spelled out in the Charter, it has been widely accepted in practice as well 
as in doctrine.”). 
233. Id.  
234. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N., supra note 183, ¶ 3.  
235. Id.  
236. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.  
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Article 25 declares, “the Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter”.237 Article 103 also states “in the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.”238 
The precedents in international tribunals, however, demonstrate 
more flexibility when dealing with Security Council decisions. 
Several decisions of International Court of Justice (ICJ) and European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments suggest that limited review is 
allowable in international courts.239  
 The Security Council passed many resolutions entailing 
different levels of sanctions especially after the Cold War.240 This 
raised an issue as to whether sanctions ratified by the Security 
Council are reviewable by the ICJ. This was one of the issues in two 
ICJ cases, Lockerbie (1992) and Case Concerning the Application of 
the Genocide Convention (1993).241 In the Lockerbie case, Libya 
claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom are not 
entitled to request extradition of the two accused Libyan citizens who 
were involved in the Lockerbie event.242 The US and UK request was 
based on Resolutions 731, 748 (1992) and Resolution 883 (1993), 
demanding Libya to cooperate fully with the United Kingdom and the 
United States in order to eradicate international terrorism.243 Libya’s 
argument was that it did not have an extradition treaty with neither the 
United Kingdom nor the United States.244 Libya also argued that 
pursuant to the 1971 Montreal Convention it has jurisdiction to try the 
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237. U.N. Charter art. 25.  
238. U.N. Charter art. 103.  
239. See BYERS, supra note 230; De Wet, supra note 230; DROUBI, supra note 230; see 
also Jose Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1-4 (1996).  
240. See JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 3 (2007). 
241. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Ariel Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary 
Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115; Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43. 
242. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Ariel Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary 
Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115, 128-29. 
243. Id.  
244. Id. at 130-31.  
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accused Libyan citizens.245 The United Kingdom and the United 
States raised preliminary objections stating, inter alia, that the ICJ 
does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate because the relevant Security 
Council Resolution trump rights arising out of the Montreal 
Convention.246 They invoked Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter 
as applicable provisions in the case.247 The Court, however, upheld its 
jurisdiction because “Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and 
883 (1993) were in fact adopted after the filing of the Application on 
3 March 1992. In accordance with its established jurisprudence, if the 
Court had jurisdiction on that date, it continues to do so.”248 In other 
words, the Court did not accept the argument that Security Council 
Resolutions can supersede the international convention, as a jus cogen 
norm would under similar circumstances.   
 Judge Schwebel, who was the president of the court at the 
time, wrote a dissenting opinion. He posited that the court lacks the 
power to review the decisions of the Security Council and cannot 
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and to decide upon responsive measures to 
be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.”249 
One of his main arguments was that the Security Council could not be 
a party to the proceeding, which “would run counter to fundamental 
juridical principles.”250  
In the Case Concerning the Application of the Genocide 
Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina) the Court also addressed the 
issue of the reviewability of Security Council decisions vis-à-vis 
states’ rights.251 In this case, the issue was whether the Security 
Council Resolution dictating arms embargo on Bosnia is reviewable 

245. Id. at 12-13. ("The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation (23 September 1971).  Article 5 (2) declares that “Each Contracting 
State shall likewise take such measures as necessary to establish jurisdiction over offenses 
mentioned . . . in case where alleged offender is present in its territory ad it does not extradite 
him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned.”  
246. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Ariel Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary 
Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115, 10-11.  
247. Id. at 17-18.  
248. Id. 
249. Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), 1998 I.C.J. 155, 68-69 
(Schwebel, Pres., dissenting).  
250. Id. at 61.  
251. Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 63.  
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considering the fact that the resolution has a potentially negative 
impact on Bosnia’s right to self-defense.252 The Court declared that 
the right to self-defense should not be impaired by the Security 
Council decision:  
 “That Security Council resolution 713 (1991), imposing a 
weapons embargo upon the former Yugoslavia, must be construed in 
a manner that shall not impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the terms of 
United Nations Charter Article 51 and the rules of customary 
international law.”253  
 These two cases clearly show that reviewability of 
international sanctions imposed by the Security Council is possible at 
least in a limited way. As John Dugard posits “total rejection of 
judicial review is unlikely to prevail.”254 There is also a recent highly 
controversial case that was litigated before the European Court of 
Justice. The so-called Kadi judgment was very provocative in the area 
of human rights and the Security Council decisions.255 It involves a 
Security Council Decision, which identifies Kadi as one of the 
supporters of Al-Qaeda and, henceforth, subject to the imposed 
sanctions. The decision was followed by several Security Council 
Resolutions ordering the freeze of assets of individuals and entities 
associated with Al-Qaeda as determined by the Sanction Committee 
of the Security Council.256 Following the decision of the Sanctions 
Committee, the Council of Europe adopted Regulation 881/2002 
containing a list of individuals and entities including Kadi and the Al 
Barakaat International Foundation.257 Kadi disputed the appearance of 
his name and his company on the sanctions list and brought a case in 
the Court of First Instance to challenge the regulation.258 Mr. Kadi 
argued, inter alia, that his right to judicial review, his right to 
property and the principle of proportionality were violated in the 
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252. Id.  
253. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 3, 6 (Apr. 8, 
1993). 
254. John Dugard, Judicial Review of Sanctions, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001).  
255. Eur. Comm’n and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 P. C-
593/10 P & C-595/10 P, [2008] ECR I–6351.  
256. TERRORISM: COMMENTARY ON SECURITY DOCUMENTS, VOL 122: U.N. RESPONSE 
TO AL QAEDA DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH 2011 13, 15 (Kristen Boon et al. eds., 2012).  
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case.259 The case also dealt with the supremacy of the Security 
Council Resolution over the EU law.  The Court accepted the 
argument of Mr. Kadi with regards to the infringement of his 
fundamental rights. It concluded that the court should ensure the 
review of observance of the fundamental rights as stipulated by the 
European Community.260 In a subtle way, the Court argued that 
reviewing the Community measure based on the Security Council 
measure did not amount to challenging the content and the primacy of 
the resolution itself.261 The European Community, according to the 
Court, should take into account the object and purpose of the 
decisions of the Security Council but the implementation is still 
within the scope of domestic legal systems.262 Pursuant to the Court’s 
reasoning, the mere fact that a regulation is based on the Security 
Council Resolution does not immune it to review especially from the 
human rights perspective.263   
 It was not until the post-Cold War era that the international 
courts had to seriously grapple with the issue of the reviewability of 
international sanctions.264 Yet, the decisions discussed above 
demonstrate that international courts have limited power to review 
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Court declares unlike the present case, there was a link between the action and the respondent 
state. Henceforth, in the Bosphorus case, the Court found the claim admissible as to the seizure 
of assets even though it was EC Council Regulation based on US Security Council: “The 
Court did not therefore consider that any question arose as to its competence, notably ratione 
personae, vis-à-vis the respondent State despite the fact that the source of the impugned 
seizure was an EC Council Regulation which, in turn, applied a UNSC Resolution.” Id. ¶ 151. 
264.  FARRALL, supra note 240.  
2014] COMBATTING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1781 
international sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.265 The 
Courts’ judgments confirm that the very nature of the restoration of 
peace and order in international relations has been delegated to the 
Security Council and is not subject to review. However, the 
implementation of the sanctions especially vis-à-vis fundamental 
rights is reviewable.266  
 The question is whether an arbitral tribunal, constituted 
pursuant to bilateral investment treaties or other documents, can 
review international sanctions. Different types of international 
sanctions can be viewed in the following table:  
 
 Individual Sanctions General Sanctions 
 
National Sanctions 
 
 
Broad Review (no 
justification for 
breach) 
 
 
Broad Review (no 
justification for 
breach) 
International 
Sanctions (UN 
Security Council) 
 
Limited Review 
(correspondence of 
regulation imposing 
sanctions) 
Broad Review 
(legality of sanctions 
as applied) 
 
 This table briefly describes the different scenarios when 
international sanctions enter into the scene of international arbitration 
and the potential outcomes. The first relevant distinction is whether 
the source of an international sanction at question is internal or 
international. As discussed in the previous section,267 invoking 
internal laws is generally not a valid argument in the context of 
international disputes. In other words, one party cannot resort to its 

265. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Ariel Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary 
Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 115; Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43.  
266. Id.; Alvarez, supra note 239; BYERS, supra note 230; DROUBI, supra note 230; De 
Wet, supra note 230.  
267. See supra Part III.C.  
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internal laws for justification of its breach of international 
obligations.268  
The status of international sanctions imposed by the Security 
Council is more challenging. If the Security Council specifically 
names an individual, a company or an entity, the arbitral tribunal does 
not have much room to review. In this case, similar to the Kadi and 
Bosphorus cases, the arbitral tribunal could review the internal 
regulation ratified pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution. 
The review in this scenario is restricted to ensuring that the internal 
regulation corresponds fully with the Security Council Resolution. On 
the other hand, if the Security Council Resolution has a broad 
language, as commonly is the case, the arbitral tribunal could hear 
arguments regarding the application of the Resolution. Borrowing 
from US Constitutional language, in this scenario the arbitral tribunal 
can review the UN sanctions “as applied” in the case before it.  
Evidently it does not have the power to rule on the “legality” (similar 
to “constitutionality” in US constitutional law) of international 
sanctions.269  
 Expanding the power of the reviewability of arbitral tribunals 
will ensure greater compliance as well as fairness when dealing with 
international sanctions. Even minor power of reviewability will create 
stronger legitimacy and, henceforth, more effectiveness. Jose Alvarez, 
who is among a few scholars who discussed this issue in the context 
of ICJ, stipulates the same possibility for arbitral tribunals. 270 In a 
footnote, he posits that the private right of actions should not be 
barred solely based on the existence of a Security Council decision.271 
The underlying policy is that “termination of such private rights of 

268. See generally George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012) (explaining that internal laws can have 
some effects on “gateway” issues such as consent to international arbitration). 
269. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (“It is true that when, if ever, 
the provisions set forth in the ordinance in tedious and minute detail, come to be concretely 
applied to particular premises, including those of the appellee, or to particular conditions, or to 
be considered in connection with specific complaints, some of them, or even many of them, 
may be found to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.”). See generally Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).  
270.  Alvarez, supra note 239 (contrasting two approaches to judicial review of Security 
Council decisions: realpolitik approach which argues that UN Charter is not a constitution and 
Security Council Decisions are not reviewable under any circumstance. The other side of the 
spectrum is those who are inspired by Marbury v. Madison decision and believe in the judicial 
reviewability over Security Council action. He concludes that judicial review is evolving in 
international law and reaching different modes of judicial review is possible).  
271. Id. at 12.  
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action goes beyond protecting the Council’s supremacy…absent 
remedial action by the Council, individual may have no remedy even 
when a state has applied the sanction too broadly, to the detriment of 
contractual or other rights.”272  
CONCLUSION 
International investment law grew significantly since the end of 
the Cold War, as did the international sanctions regimes designed to 
change the behavior of recalcitrant states. Yet, inevitably, the 
overreaching scope of both regimes resulted in a clash between the 
two, creating unprecedented legal challenges. There has not been 
thorough research on the interplay of these two regimes. This piece is 
the first attempt to analyze this complex matter employing Iran an 
example. Iran has been subject to a web of economic sanctions, 
unparalleled in history. Yet, there is a new revival of interest in 
investment in Iran due to the recent thaw between Iran and the 
Western Countries.  
The new nuclear deal with Iran has refreshed many thorny legal 
issues pertaining to investing in Iran. The complex regime of 
sanctions, Iran’s unfavorable constitutional provisions and numerous 
investment treaties are all at play when it comes to investment in Iran. 
The effect of economic sanctions on potential investments in Iran 
poses the most complex challenge to the business community. On the 
other hand, hurdles related to Iran’s constitution worry companies as 
to lack of sufficient protection. Conversely, a multitude of modern 
investment treaties Iran has concluded brings about international 
responsibility to the Iranian Government to provide protection for 
investment. These three dimensions (i.e. economic sanctions, 
constitutional hurdles, investment treaties) have created 
unprecedented questions, which this article tried to answer. By 
referring to Iran’s example, this article specifically placed the clash 
between investment and economic sanctions under careful 
examination.   
There is no doubt that economic sanctions, along with domestic 
legal obstacles in Iran’s legal system, are major hindrances to foreign 
investment in Iran. One should bear in mind, however, that in the past 
two decades the Islamic Republic of Iran has enjoyed tremendous 
investment in its gas and oil industry as well as others. These 

272. Id.  
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investments primarily occurred in the period when Iran was seeking 
reconciliation with the West from 1997 to 2003.273 In the meantime, 
Iran concluded many bilateral investment treaties with different 
countries. These BITs, especially arbitration clauses, are becoming 
more important due to increasing interest in investment in Iran.  
The BITs Iran has signed with different countries are generally 
progressive. All of them have arbitration clauses, which can 
adjudicate the cases based on either ICC rules or ad hoc rules they 
design.274 Iran is also a member of the New York Convention, 
meaning that arbitral awards will be enforceable in Iran.275 
Furthermore, national laws in Iran recognize arbitral awards as an 
alternative method for local courts upon parties’ consent.276 All BITs 
have stipulated compensation in cases of nationalization and 
expropriation.277 Henceforth, although Iranian BITs are not as 
comprehensive as, for example, US BITs, they include all of the 
major elements.278 If at any point Iran becomes a member of the 
ICSID, pursuant to some of its BITs, the potential disputes could be 
referred to the ICSID as well.279  
Generally speaking, the BITs Iran has concluded in the period 
between 1995 to 2007 will sooner or later be the platform from which 
arbitration cases arise. In other words, these BITs furnish a 
convenient alternative for Iran’s national courts. Furthermore, it 
seems that neither the conflicting domestic national provisions of Iran 
nor the majority of sanctions will affect potential arbitration 
proceedings. The international sanctions, including UN Sanctions, do 
not elevate to the status of jus cogens norms, and thus are not 
preemptory.280 On the other hand, the precedents in international 
courts including the International Court of Justice, European Court of 
Justice, and European Court of Human rights demonstrate the 
possibility of review of international sanctions. US and EU sanctions 

273. Energy and the Iranian Economy: Hearing Before the  J. Econ. Comm., 109th 
Cong. 48 (2006). 
274. Id.; see also supra Part I.D. 
275. New York Convention, supra note 70.  
276. See Qanuni Davari Tejari Beinolmelal, supra note 69; Aini Dadrasii Madani, supra 
note 69. 
277. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2005, art. 9 (Iran); Iranian 
Model BIT, art. 6.  
278. Supra Part 1.B.  
279. Atai, supra note 62.  
280. See Alvarez, supra note 239; BYERS, supra note 230; De Wet, supra note 230; 
DROUBI, supra note 230.   
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cannot trump international obligations of companies and other 
states.281 UN Sanctions are also subject to arbitral review to the extent 
that they address the issues of applicability and implementation of the 
sanctions.282 The arbitral tribunals can review international sanctions 
in line with the object and purpose of bilateral or multilateral 
investment treaties. The mere fact of prima facie existence and the 
applicability of the UN sanctions do not preclude arbitral tribunals to 
review and adjudicate the relevance and implementation of the UN 
sanctions.  
It is highly unlikely that the business community will hold from 
investing in Iran considering the new rapprochement, despite 
Obama’s warning about sanctions. The companies might enter Iran 
through shell companies in order to avoid being directly subject to US 
sanctions. On the other hand, Iran has become part of the international 
investment regime, which, as described, to a great extent might 
attenuate the effect of economic sanctions. The international 
investment regime might serve as a platform for an unintended 
consequence, and that is combatting economic sanctions.  

281. Supra notes 230, 239 and accompanying text.   
282. Supra notes 230, 239 and accompanying text. 
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